WW2: The process of superpowerdom

Essay submitted by Unknown

It is often wondered how the superpowers achieved their position of dominance. It

seems that the maturing of the two superpowers, Russia and the United States, can be

traced to World War II. To be a superpower, a nation needs to have a strong economy,

an overpowering military, immense international political power and, related to this, a

strong national ideology. It was this war, and its results, that caused each of these

superpowers to experience such a preponderance of power. Before the war, both

nations were fit to be described as great powers, but it would be erroneous to say that

they were superpowers at that point.

To understand how the second World War impacted these nations so greatly, we must

examine the causes of the war. The United States gained its strength in world affairs

from its status as an economic power. In the years before the war, America was the

world's largest producer. In the USSR at the same time, Stalin was implementing his

'five year plans' to modernise the Soviet economy. From these situations, similar foreign

policies resulted from widely divergent origins.

Roosevelt's isolationism emerged from the wide and prevalent domestic desire to remain

neutral in any international conflicts. It commonly widely believed that Americans

entered the first World War simply in order to save industry's capitalist investments in

Europe. Whether this is the case or not, Roosevelt was forced to work with an

inherently isolationist Congress, only expanding its horizons after the bombing of Pearl

Harbour. He signed the Neutrality Act of 1935, making it illegal for the United States to

ship arms to the belligerents of any conflict. The act also stated that belligerents could

buy only non-armaments from the US, and even these were only to be bought with

cash. In contrast, Stalin was by necessity interested in European affairs, but only to

the point of concern to the USSR. Russian foreign policy was fundamentally Leninist in

its concern to keep the USSR out of war. Stalin wanted to consolidate Communist

power and modernise the country's industry. The Soviet Union was committed to

collective action for peace, as long as that commitment did not mean that the Soviet

Union would take a brunt of a Nazi attack as a result. Examples of this can be seen in

the Soviet Unions' attempts to achieve a mutual assistance treaty with Britain and

France. These treaties, however, were designed more to create security for the West,

as opposed to keeping all three signatories from harm. At the same time, Stalin was

attempting to polarise both the Anglo-French, and the Axis powers against each other.

The important result of this was the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact, which partitioned

Poland, and allowed Hitler to start the war. Another side-effect of his policy of playing

both sides was that it caused incredible distrust towards the Soviets from the Western

powers after 1940. This was due in part to the fact that Stalin made several demands

for both influence in the Dardanelles, and for Bulgaria to be recognised as a Soviet

dependant.

The seeds of superpowerdom lie here however, in the late thirties. R.J. Overy has

written that "stability in Europe might have been achieved through the existence of

powers so strong that they could impose their will on the whole of the international

system, as has been the case since 1945...." At the time, there was no power in the

world that could achieve such a feat. Britain and France were in imperial decline, and

more concerned about colonial economics than the stability of Europe. Both imperial

powers assumed that empire-building would necessarily be an inevitable feature of the

world system. German aggression could have been stifled early had the imperial powers

had acted in concert. The memories of World War One however, were too powerful,

and the general public would not condone a military solution at that point. The

aggression of Germany, and to a lesser extent that of Italy, can be explained by this

decline of imperial power. They were simply attempting to fill the power vacuum in

Europe that Britain and France unwittingly left. After the economic crisis of the 1930's,

Britain and France lost much of their former international standing-as the world markets

plummeted; so did their relative power. The two nations were determined to maintain

their status as great powers however, without relying on the US or the USSR for

support of any kind. They went to war only because further appeasement would have

only served to remove from them their little remaining world standing and prestige. The

creation of a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Germany can be

viewed as an example of imperial decline as well. Stalin explained the fact that he

reached a rapprochement with Germany, and not one with Great Britain by stating that

"the USSR and Germany had wanted to change the old equilibrium... England and

France wanted to preserve it. Germany also wanted to make a change in the

equilibrium, and this common desire to get rid of the old equilibrium had created the

basis for the rapprochement with Germany." The common desire of many of the great

European powers for a change in the world state system meant that either a massive

war would have to be fought; or that one of the great powers would need to attempt

to make the leap to superpower status without reaping the advantages such a conflict

could give to the power making the attempt. Such benefits as wartime economic gains,

vastly increased internal markets from conquered territory, and increased access to

resources and the means of industrial production would help fuel any nation's drive for

superpowerdom. One of two ways war could have been avoided was for the United

States or Russia to have taken powerful and vigorous action against Germany in 1939.

Robert A. Divine, holds that "superpowerdom gives a nation the framework by which a

nation is able to extend globally the reach of its power and influence." This can be seen

especially as the ability to make other nations (especially in the Third World) act in

ways that the superpower prefers, even if this is not in the weaker nation's self

interest. The question must then be raised, were the United States and Russia

superpowers even then, could coercive, unilateral actions taken by them have had

such significant ramifications for the international order? It must be concluded that,

while they were not yet superpowers, they certainly were great powers, with the

incredible amount of influence that accompanies such status. Neither the United States

nor the Soviet Union possessed the international framework necessary to be a super

power at this time. It is likely that frameworks similar to Nato or the Warsaw Pact could

have been developed, but such infrastructures would have necessarily been on a much

smaller scale, and without influence as the proposed Anglo-American (English speaking

world) pact was. At this time, neither the United States nor Russia had developed the

overwhelming advantages that they possessed at the end of the war. There are

several factors that allowed them to become superpowers: a preponderance of military

force, growing economies, and the creation of ideology-backed blocs of power.

The United States, it seems, did not become a superpower by accident. Indeed,

Roosevelt had a definite European policy that was designed from the start to secure a

leading role for the United States. The US non-policy which ignored Eastern Europe in

the late thirties and forties, while strongly supported domestically, was another means

to Roosevelt's plans to achieve US world supremacy. After the war, Roosevelt

perceived that the way to dominate world affairs was to reduce Europe's international

role (vis-a-vis the United States, as the safest way of preventing future world

conflict), the creation of a permanent superpower rivalry with the USSR to ensure world

stability. Roosevelt sought to reduce Europe's geopolitical role by ensuring the

fragmentation of the continent into small, relatively powerless, and ethnically

homogenous states. When viewed in light of these goals Roosevelt appears very similar

to Stalin who, in Churchill's words, "Wanted a Europe composed of little states,

disjointed, separate, and weak." Roosevelt was certain that World War Two would

destroy continental Europe as a military and economic force, removing Germany and

France from the stage of world powers. This would leave the United States, Great

Britain, and the USSR as the last remaining European world powers.

In order to make it nearly impossible for France to reclaim her former world position,

Roosevelt objected to De Gaul taking power immediately after the war. Roosevelt

defended the Allies "right [to] hold the political situation in trust for the French people."

He presented General Eisenhower control of France and Italy for up to a year, in order

to "restore civil order." As British foreign minister Anthony Eden stated, "... Roosevelt

wanted to hold the strings of France's future in his hands, so that he could decide that

country's fate." It seems inexcusable that Roosevelt desired to hold an ally's nation in

trust, comparable to Italy, who was a belligerent. It could be argued, however that

they were taking the reigns of power, not from the resistance, but from the hands of

the Vichy French.

It might be asked why Roosevelt did not plot the fall of the British Empire as well. A

cynical answer to this is that Roosevelt understood that the United States was not

powerful enough to check the Soviet Union's power in Europe by itself. It made sense

that because the United States and Britain are cultural cousins, the most commodious

solution would be to continue the tradition of friendliness, set out in the Atlantic

Charter earlier. As far as economic or military competition, Roosevelt knew that if he

could open the British Empire to free trade it would not be able to effectively compete

with the United States. This is because an imperial paradigm allows one to sell goods in

a projectionist manner, finding markets within the Empire. This allows a nation to have

restrictive tariffs on imports, which precludes foreign competition. A nation, that is

primarily concerned with finding markets on the other hand, is in a much better position

for global economic expansion, as it is in its interest to pursue free trade. The more

generous, and likely the correct interpretation is that Roosevelt originally planned to

have a system of three superpowers, including only the US, the UK, and the USSR. This

was modified from the original position which was formed before the USSR joined the

allies, that held for Great Britain to take a primary role in Europe, and the United States

to act as a custodial in Asia. Later, after it was seen that either the Germans or the

Russians would dominate Eastern Europe, the plan was forced to change. The plan

shifted from one where the US and Great Britain would keep order in Europe, to one

where Great Britain and the USSR would keep order in Europe as local superpowers, and

the US would act as an impartial, world wide mediator. Roosevelt hoped for the creation

of an Anglo-American-Russo world police force. However, Roosevelt, underestimated

the power of the Russian ideology. He believed that the Russians would back away from

communism for the sake of greater stability and union with the West. Roosevelt saw

the Soviet Union as a country like any other, except for her preoccupation with

security (the safety corridor in Eastern Europe that Stalin insisted on), but he thought

that that this could be explained by the cultural and historical background of Russia. It

was not thought unreasonable to request a barrier of satellite states to provide a sense

of security, given that Russia and the USSR had been invaded at least four times since

1904. It was felt that granting the Soviet Union some territory in Eastern and Central

Europe would satisfy their political desires for territory. It was only after experiencing

post World War II Soviet expansion, that the Soviet quest for territory was seen to be

inherently unlimited. Roosevelt felt that the position in Eastern Europe, vis-a-vis the

Soviet Union, was analogous to that of Latin America, vis-a-vis the United States. He

felt that there should be definite spheres of influence, as long as it was clear that the

Soviet Union was not to interfere with the governments of the affected nations. The

reason that Roosevelt did not object to a large portion of Eastern Europe coming under

the totalitarian control of the Soviet Union was that he believed the weakness in the

Soviet economy caused by the war would require Stalin to seek Western aid, and open

the Russians to Western influence.

Many historians feel that Roosevelt was simply naive to believe that the Soviet Union

would act in such a way. Arthur Schlesinger saw the geopolitical and ideological

differences between the United States and the Soviet Union. He stressed however, the

ideological differences as being most important. "The two nations were constructed on

opposite and profoundly antagonistic principles. They were divided by the most

significant and fundamental disagreements over human rights, individual liberties,

cultural freedom, the role of civil society, the direction of history, and the destiny of

man." Stalin's views regarding the possibility of rapprochement between the USSR and

the West were similar. He thought that the Russian Revolution created two antipodal

camps: Anglo-America and Soviet Russia. Stalin felt that the best way to ensure the

continuation of communist world revolution was to continually annex the countries

bordering the Soviet Union, instead of attempting to foster revolution in the more

advanced industrial societies. This is the underlying reason behind the Soviet Union's

annexation of much of Eastern Europe, and the subjugation of the rest. The creation of

the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe did not come as a total surprise. Roosevelt thought

that America's position after the war, vis-a-vis the rest of the world, would put him in a

very good position to impose his view of the post-war world order. The Joint Chiefs of

Staff however, predicted that after the German defeat, the Russians would be able to

impose whatever territorial settlement they wanted in Central Europe and the Balkans.

World War II caused the USSR to rapidly evolve from a military farce, to a military

superpower. In 1940 it was hoped that if the Soviet Union was attacked, that they

could hold off the Germans long enough for the West to help fight them off with

reinforcements. In 1945 the Soviet Army was marching triumphantly through Berlin. Was

this planned by Stalin in the same way that Roosevelt seems to have planned to

achieve world supremacy? The answer to this question must be a somewhat ambivalent

"no." While Stalin desired to see Russian dominance in Europe and Asia if possible, he

did not have a systematic plan to achieve it. Stalin was an opportunist, and a skilful

one. He demanded that Britain and America recognise territory gained by the Soviet

Union in pacts and treaties that it had signed with Germany, for instance. Stalin's main

plan seemed to be to conquer all the territory that his armies could reach, and create

to socialist states within it. From this it can be seen that one of the primary reasons

for the superpower rivalry was Roosevelt's misunderstanding of the Soviet system.

Roosevelt and his advisors thought that giving the Soviet Union control of Central and

Eastern Europe, would result in the creation of states controlled somewhat similar to

the way in which the United States controlled Cuba after the Platt Amendment. The

State Department assumed that the USSR would simply control the foreign policy of the

satellite nations, leaving the individual countries open to Western trade. This idea was

alien to Soviet leaders. To be controlled by the Soviet Union at all was to become a

socialist state; freedom to decide the domestic structure, or how to interact with the

world markets was denied to such states. Stalin assumed that his form of control over

these states would mean the complete Sovietization of their societies, and Roosevelt

was blind to the internal logic of the Soviet system which in effect required this.

Roosevelt believed that the dissolution of Comintern in 1943, along with the defeat of

Trotsky, meant that Stalin was looking to move the Soviet Union westward in its

political alignment. While Stalin might have been primarily concerned with "socialism in

one country," communist revolution was a "paramount, if deferred policy goal."

Roosevelt's desire for a favourable post-war settlement appears to be naive at first

glance. The post war plan that he had created was dependant upon the creation of an

open market economy, and the prevailing nature of the dollar. He was convinced that

the Soviet Union would move westward and abandon its totalitarian political system

along with its policy of closed and internal markets. When seen from such a

perspective, Roosevelt's agreement to let the Soviet Union dominate half of Europe

does not seem as ludicrous. His fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the

Soviet state can be forgiven, once it has been allowed that an apparently peaceful

nature was apparent at the time, and that it had existed for a relatively short time.

While the United States wanted to "eschew isolationism, and set and example of

international co-operation in a world ripe for United States leadership," the Soviet Union

was organising its ideals around the vision of a continuing struggle between two

fundamentally antagonistic ideologies.

"The decisive period of the century, so far as the eventual fate of democracy was

concerned, came with the defeat of fascism in 1945 and the American-sponsored

conversion of Germany and Japan to democracy and a much greater degree of

economic liberalism...." Such was the result of America attempting to spread its

ideology to the rest of the world. The United States believed that the world at large,

especially the Third World, would be attracted to the political views of the West if it

could be shown that democracy and free trade provided the citizens of a nation with a

higher standard of living. As United States' Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, "To the

extent that we are able to manage our domestic affairs successfully, we shall win

converts to our creed in every land." It has been seen that Roosevelt and his

administration thought that this appeal for converts would extend into the Soviet

sphere of influence, and even to the Kremlin itself. The American ideology of democracy

is not complete without the accompanying necessity of open markets.

America has tried to achieve an open world economy for over a century. From the

attempts to keep the open door policy in China to Article VII of the Lend-Lease act,

free trade has been seen as central to American security. The United States, in 1939,

forced Great Britain to begin to move away from its imperial economic system. Cordell

Hull, then Secretary of State, was extremely tough with Great Britain on this point. He

used Article VII of the Lend-Lease, which demanded that Britain not create any more

colonial economic systems after the war. Churchill fought this measure bitterly, realising

that it would mean the effective end of the British Empire, as well as meaning that

Great Britain would no longer be able to compete economically with the United States.

However, Churchill did eventually agree to it, realising that without the help of the

United States, he would lose much more than Great Britain's colonies.

American leadership of the international economy-thanks to the institutions created at

Bretton Woods in 1944, its strong backing for European integration with the Marshall

Plan in 1947 and support for the Schuman Plan thereafter... (both dependent in good

measure on American power) created the economic, cultural, military, and political

momentum that enabled liberal democracy to flourish in competition with Soviet

communism.

It was the adoption of the Marshall Plan that allowed Western Europe to make its quick

economic recovery from the ashes of World War II. The seeds of the massive expansion

of the military-industrial complex of the early fifties are also to be found in the post war

recovery. Feeling threatened by the massive amount of aid the United States was

giving Western Europe, the Soviet Union responded with its form of economic aid to its

satellite counties. This rivalry led to the Western fear of Soviet domination, and was

one of the precursors to the arms-race of the Cold War.

The foundation for the eventual rise of the Superpowers is clearly found in the years

leading up to and during World War II. The possibility of the existence of superpowers

arose from the imperial decline of Great Britain and France, and the power vacuum that

this decline created in Europe. Germany and Italy tried to fill this hole while Britain and

France were more concerned with their colonial empires. The United States and the

Soviet Union ended the war with vast advantages in military strength. At the end of

the war, the United States was in the singular position of having the world's largest and

strongest economy. This allowed them to fill the power gap left in Europe by the

declining imperial powers.

Does this, however, make them Superpowers? With the strong ideologies that they

both possessed, and the ways in which they attempted to diffuse this ideology through

out the world after the war, it seems that it would. The question of Europe having been

settled for the most part, the two superpowers rushed to fill the power vacuum left by

Japan in Asia. It is this, the global dimension of their political, military and economic

presence that makes the United States and the USSR superpowers. It was the rapid

expansion of the national and international structures of the Soviet Union and the

United States during the war that allowed them to assume their roles as superpowers.

Bibliography

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Issue 96, Summer 93: pp.65-86.

Divine, Robert A. "The Cold War as History" Reviews in American History. Issue 3, vol.

21, Sept 93: 26-32.

Dukes, Paul. The Last Great Game: Events, Conjectures, Structures. London: Pinter

Publishers, 1989

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Smith, Tony. "The United States and the Global Struggle for Democracy," in America's

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1.<#1> Overy R.J. The Origins of the Second World War (Longman: New York) 1987

p.7 <#2> Overy pp. 88-89

2.<#3> Overy p .8

3.<#4> Ovsyany, Igor. The Origins of World War Two (Novosti Press Agency:

Moscow) 1989 pp. 31-34.

4.<#5> Overy p. 70

5.<#6> Overy p. 85

6.<#7> Overy p. 89

7.<#8> Overy p. 91

8.<#9> Aga-Rossi p. 81

9.<#10> Divine, Robert A. "The Cold War as History" Reviews in American History,

Sept 93, vol 21. p. 528.

10.<#11> Aga-Rossi, Elena. "Roosevelt's European Policy and the Origins of the Cold

War" Telos Summer 93. Issue 96 pp. 65-66

11.<#12> Aga-Rossi p. 66

12.<#13> Aga-Rossi p. 69

13.<#14> Aga-Rossi p. 72

14.<#15> Aga-Rossi p. 73

15.<#16> Aga-Rossi p. 77

16.<#17> Aga-Rossi p. 70

17.<#18> Divine p. 528

18.<#19> Aga-Rossi p. 80

19.<#20> Aga-Rossi p. 68

20.<#21> Aga-Rossi pp. 74-75

21.<#22> Aga-Rossi p. 79.

22.<#23> Aga-Rossi p. 83.

23.<#24> Tony Smith, "The United States and the Global Struggle for Democracy," in

America's Mission: The

United States and Democracy in the Twentieth Century (New York: Twentieth Century

Fund Press, 1995) [http://epn.org/tcf/xxstru 03.html] 1995

24.<#25> Dukes, Paul. The Last Great Game: Events, Conjectures, Structures (Pinter

Publishers: London) 1989 p. 107.

25.<#26> Le Ferber, Walter. The American Age: US Foreign Policy at Home and

Abroad 170 to the Present. (W.W. Norton Company: New York) 1994 p. 417-418.

26.<#27> Tony Smith, "The United States and the Global Struggle for Democracy," in

America's Mission: The United States and Democracy in the Twentieth Century (New

York:

Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995) [http://epn.org/tcf/xxstru 03.html] 1995