Essay, Research Paper: The Effects Of The P-51 Mustang In World War II

The effects of the P-51 Mustang in World War II
Essay submitted by Unknown

Abstract
This paper deals with the contributions of the P-51 Mustang to the eventual victory of
the Allies in Europe during World War II. It describes the war scene in Europe before
the P-51 was introduced, traces the development of the fighter, its advantages, and
the abilities it was able to contribute to the Allies' arsenal. It concludes with the effect
that the P-51 had on German air superiority, and how it led the destruction of the
Luftwaffe. The thesis is that: it was not until the advent of the North American P-51
Mustang fighter, and all of the improvements, benefits, and side effects that it brought
with it, that the Allies were able to achieve air superiority over the Germans.

This paper was inspired largely by my grandfather, who flew the P-51 out of Leiston,
England, during WW II and contributed to the eventual Allied success that is traced in
this paper. He flew over seventy missions between February and August 1944, and
scored three kills against German fighters.

Table of Contents
Introduction
Reasons for the Pre-P-51 Air Situation
The Pre-P-51 Situation
The Allied Purpose in the Air War
The Battle at Schweinfurt
The Development of the P-51
The Installation of the Merlin Engines
Features, Advantages, and Benefits of the P-51
The P-51's Battle Performance
The Change in Policy on Escort
Fighter Function
P-51's Disrupt Luftwaffe Fighter Tactics
P-51's Give Bombers Better Support
Conclusion
Works Cited


Introduction
On September 1, 1939, the German military forces invaded Poland to begin World War
II. This invasion was very successful because of its use of a new military strategic
theory-blitzkrieg. Blitzkrieg, literally "lightning war," involved the fast and deadly
coordination of two distinct forces, the Wermacht and the Luftwaffe. The Wermacht
advanced on the ground, while the Luftwaffe destroyed the enemy air force, attacked
enemy ground forces, and disrupted enemy communication and transportation systems.
This setup was responsible for the successful invasions of Poland, Norway, Western
Europe, the Balkans and the initial success of the Russian invasion. For many years
after the first of September, the air war in Europe was dominated by the Luftwaffe. No
other nation involved in the war had the experience, technology, or numbers to
challenge the Luftwaffe's superiority. It was not until the United States joined the war
effort that any great harm was done to Germany and even then, German air superiority
remained unscathed. It was not until the advent of the North American P-51 Mustang
fighter, and all of the improvements, benefits, and side effects that it brought with it,
that the Allies were able to achieve air superiority over the Germans.

Reasons for the Pre-P-51 Air Situation
The continued domination of the European skies by the Luftwaffe was caused by two
factors, the first of which was the difference in military theory between the Luftwaffe
and the Royal Air Force. The theories concerning the purpose and function of the
Luftwaffe and RAF were exactly opposite and were a result of their experiences in
World War I. During WW I, Germany attempted a strategic bombing effort directed
against England using Gothas (biplane bombers) and Zeppelins (slow-moving hot-air
balloons) which did not give much of a result. This, plus the fact that German military
theory at the beginning of WW II was based much more on fast quick results
(Blitzkrieg), meant that Germany decided not to develop a strategic air force. The
Luftwaffe had experienced great success when they used tactical ground-attack
aircraft in Spain (i.e. at Guernica), and so they figured that their air force should mainly
consist of this kind of planes. So Germany made the Luftwaffe a ground support force
that was essentially an extension of the army and functioned as a long- range, aerial
artillery. The RAF, on the other hand, had experimented with ground-attack fighters
during WW I, and had suffered grievous casualty rates. This, combined with the fact
that the British had been deeply enraged and offended by the German Gotha and
Zeppelin attacks on their home soil, made them determined to develop a strategic air
force that would be capable of bombing German soil in the next war. Thus, at the
beginning of WW II, the RAF was mostly a strategic force that consisted of heavy
bombers and backup fighters, and lacked any tactical dive- bombers or ground-attack
fighters. (Boyne 21)

The Pre-P-51 Situation
Because of these fundamental differences, the situation that resulted after the air war
began was: bombers in enemy territory vs. attack planes. The "in enemy territory" was
the second reason for the domination of the Luftwaffe. At the beginning of WW II, and
for many years afterward, the Allies had no long-range escort fighters, which meant
that the bombers were forced to fly most of their long journeys alone. (Perret 104)
Before the P-51 was brought into combat, the main Allied fighters were the American
P-47 Thunderbolt and the British Spitfire, neither of which had a very long range. The
rule-of-thumb for fighter ranges was that they could go as far as Aachen, which was
about 250 miles from the Allied fighters' home bases in England, before they had to turn
around. Unfortunately, most of the bombers' targets were between 400 and 700 miles
from England. (Bailey 2-3)

This meant that bombers could only be escorted into the Benelux countries, northern
France, and the very western fringe of Germany. When these unescorted, ungainly,
slow, unmaneuverable bombers flew over Germany, they were practically sitting ducks
for the fast German fighters. On the other hand, the bombers were equipped with
several machine guns and were able to consistently shoot down some of their
attackers. Because of this, "U.S. strategists were not yet convinced of the need for
long-range fighters; they continued to cling to the belief that their big bomber
formations could defend themselves over Germany." (Bailey 153)

The Allied Purpose in the Air War
The Allies knew that they had to drive German industry into the ground in order to win
the war. Since the factories, refineries, assembly-lines, and other industry-related
structures were all inland, the only way to destroy them was by sending in bombers.
The only way that the bombers could achieve real success was by gaining air
superiority, which meant that nearly all of the bombers would be able to drop their
bombs without being harassed by fighters, and return home to fight another day. The
problem with this sequence was that the Allies did not have this superiority, (Bailey 28)
because their bombers were consistently getting shot down in fairly large numbers, by
the German fighters that kept coming. The Allies soon realized that in order to gain this
superiority, they would have to destroy more German fighters. In order to destroy the
fighters, they would have to be forced into the air in greater numbers. In order to get
more German fighters into the air, the more sensitive German industries would have to
be attacked with more aggression. Following this logic, the Allies began a intensified
bombing effort that resulted in the famous bombings of Hamburg (July 24-28, 1943) and
Ploesti (August 1, 1943), among others. And, indeed, this did cause more fighters to
come up to meet and engage the bombers. Unfortunately, the bombers were
overwhelmed by the German opposition, and their losses soon began to increase. (Copp
359) The Allied air forces had, in effect, pushed a stick into a hornets' nest, hoping to
kill the hornets when they came out, and been stung by the ferocity of their response.

The Battle at Schweinfurt
The culminating point of this backfiring plan was the second bombing raid on
Schweinfurt, which occurred on October 14, 1943. Schweinfurt was the location of
huge ball-bearing factories that supplied most of the ball-bearings for the entire German
military. The U.S. Eighth Air Force had staged a fairly successful raid on the same city
two months earlier, but the second time around, the Germans were ready for them. The
official report afterwards said that the Luftwaffe "turned in a performance
unprecedented in its magnitude, in the cleverness with which it was planned, and in the
severity with which it was executed." Of the 229 bombers that actually made it all the
way to Schweinfurt, 60 were shot down, and 17 more made it home, but were damaged
beyond repair. This was a 26.5% battle loss rate for the Americans, while the Germans
only lost 38 airplanes the whole day, from all causes. (Boyne 327) This battle was one
of the key battles of the war, and undeniably proved to the Allies that the bomber
offensive could not continue without a long-range fighter escort. (Copp 444) Even
before October of '43, some had begun to realize the need for this kind of fighter. In
June, the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, General Hap Arnold, wrote a
memo to his Chief of Staff, Major General Barney Giles, which said:

This brings to my mind the absolute necessity for building a fighter airplane that can go
in and out with the bombers. Moreover, this fighter has got to go into Germany. . . .
Whether you use an existing type or have to start from scratch is your problem. Get to
work on this right away because by January '44, I want a fighter escort for all our
bombers from the U.K. into Germany. (Copp 413-414)

The Development of the P-51
In April of 1940, "Dutch" Kindleberger, president of North American Aviation, visited Sir
Henry Self, the head of the aircraft division of the British Purchasing Commission, asking
if Britain would like to buy some of his B-25 bombers. Self was not interested in buying
any more bombers, but was interested in buying a good fighter. He directed
Kindleberger to the Curtiss company, who had a new fighter design, but were too busy
building P-40's to do anything with it. Kindleberger went to Curtiss and bought their
design for $56,000. He promised Self to have the planes ready by September of 1941.
The prototype of the NA-73, as it was called, was ready to fly in October of 1940 and
proved to have an excellent design. The NA-73 had a revolutionary wing design that
allowed it to fly at high speeds without adverse compression effects. In other planes,
as they approached a certain speed, usually around 450 mph, the air would be flowing
around the wing at nearly the speed of sound, putting huge amounts of pressure on the
wings, which were unable to deal with the stress. The NA-73 did not have this problem,
which meant it could fly safely at much higher speeds. Another revolutionary idea in the
plane was the way heated air from the radiator was dealt with. The NA-73's engineers
designed it to expel this air and boost the planes speed by 15 or 25 mph. The engineers
also worked especially hard on making the plane as aerodynamic as possible, and so
they positioned the radiator in a new place, made the fuselage as narrow as possible,
and set the cockpit low in the fuselage. (Perret 118-119) It was at this point that an
error was made that made the Mustang useless as a long-range offensive fighter. When
the NA-73 was mass produced as the P-51, it was powered by a 1550 horsepower
air-cooled Allison engine, which did not have a supercharger and lost performance
above 11,800 ft. At high altitudes air pressure goes down, and so there is less oxygen
in a given amount of air, which means that engines do not burn as cleanly, and so lose
power. Superchargers compress air before it is pumped into the engine cylinders so that
there is enough oxygen for the engine to function well.

The early Allison-engined planes did not have the supercharger, and so were limited to
low-altitude operations. Even without a high- altitude capability, the Mustang was an
impressive plane and was bought in quantity by the RAF. It flew its first mission on May
10, 1942, against Berck-sur-Mer on the French coast. (Grant 17-18)

The Installation of the Merlin Engines
So, for the next eighteen months, the P-51A's continued to fly with the RAF, doing
their unexceptional jobs well. After the plane began to go into combat, some people
began looking into the idea of fitting the Mustang with a more powerful engine. As the
RAF said, it was "a bloody good airplane, only it needs a bit more poke." (Grant 22) One
day, an RAF test pilot was flying a P-51A and the thought occurred to him that the
plane could be fitted with a Rolls-Royce Merlin engine, which had about 300 more
horsepower and included a supercharger. He suggested it to Rolls-Royce's Chief
Aerodynamic Engineer and "both men realized that the combination of this sort of
performance with the aerodynamically efficient airframe of the Mustang would
revolutionize its potential." (Grant 22) This plan was duly carried out and in November
1943, the first group of P-51B's arrived in England.

Features, Advantages, and Benefits of the P-51
This final Mustang design was superior to anything else that flew at the time. The
P-51B had a huge internal gasoline tank capacity (around 425 gallons) and its engine
was very economical, using about half the gasoline of other American fighters. This
meant its range was 1080 miles and could be extended to 2600 miles when extra
drop-tanks were attached to the wings.

This made its range far more than any Allied or German fighter's. As far as performance
went, it was superior to all others as well. Neither of the other two main American
fighters could compete; the P-47 was too heavy and the P-38 had too many technical
problems. The British fighters, the Spitfire and the Hurricane did not have the range,
speed, or power. But most important was its superiority over the German fighters, the
most important of which were the FW-190 and the Me-109. The Mustang was 50 mph
faster than the Germans up to 28,000 ft beyond which it was much faster than the
FW-190 and still substantially faster than the Me-109. The Mustang had between 3000
and 4000 lbs more weight, and so was able to outdive either German plane. The
tightness of its turns was much better than the Me-109 and slightly better than the
FW-190. (Grant 31, Boyne 389-390, Bailey 153) The result of all of this was that the
Allies now had a plane that could go with the bombers all the way to and from their
targets, fight and defeat the bombers' German attackers, and not run out of fuel.

The P-51's Battle Performance
So, at the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, the new American P-51B's began
arriving in England in force. (Dupuy 34) For the first few months of the year, the
Mustangs were settling in and having their systems perfected.

But by March, the Mustangs had decisively taken control. The arrival and subsequent
heavy use of the P-51's had several effects.

The first effect that the Mustangs had was in the running air battles over Europe.
Before the beginning of 1944, the bombers had been alone as they approached their
faraway targets. But the P-51 changed this, and quickly made an impression on all
concerned, enemy and ally alike. For example, on January 11, 1944, the Eighth Air
Force launched its first deep penetration of Germany with P-51 coverage. The bombers'
targets were the cities of Oschersleben and Halberstadt, where many German planes
were being constructed. When they arrived, there were 49 Mustangs covering a force
of around 220 bombers. Even though the bombers suffered heavy casualties, they were
able to inflict substantial damage on their target factories. But the most significant
thing about the battle was the shining performance of the P-51's. Since the bombers
were attacking two different cities, the Mustang force had to divide into two groups, to
support the different attacks. Because of the sensitive nature of the bombers' targets,
the Luftwaffe came out in force to defend their factories. During the ensuing melee,
the 49 P-51's shot down 15 enemy planes without suffering a single loss. Major Howard,
the group's leader, was credited with four kills within minutes. (Bailey 155) In the grand
scheme of things, this battle was insignificant, but it goes to show how much of
advantage the P-51's had over their German counterparts. Considering that these were
essentially first-time pilots in the Mustangs' first big battle, this is very impressive.

The Change in Policy on Escort Fighter Function
Another thing happened at the same time as the arrival of the P-51 that greatly aided
the Allies and fully utilized the great capabilities of the Mustang. Before the beginning
of 1944, the bomber escort's primary function was to fly alongside the bombers, repel
any attacks made on the bombers, and generally make sure the bombers stayed safe.
Indeed, the motto of the Eighth Air Force Fighter Command was "Our Mission is to Bring
the Bombers Back Alive." One day at the beginning of the year, Jimmy Doolittle, who
was the commander of the Eighth Air Force, saw a plaque on the wall with this motto
on it and said, "That's not so. Your mission is to destroy the German Air Force. . .Take
that damned thing down." (Copp 456) And just days before, in his New Year's Day
address to the Eighth Air Force command, General Arnold had said, "My personal
message to you-this is a MUST- is to destroy the enemy air force wherever you find
them, in the air, on the ground and in the factories." (Copp 456) What this meant was
that the escort fighters were not tied to the bombers anymore, and were free to roam
over the countryside and through the towns and cities, destroying at will.

The sweeping Mustangs were released to ravage German convoys, trains, antiaircraft
gun emplacements, warehouses, airfields, factories, radar installations, and other
important things that would be impractical to be attacked by bombers. The fighters
were also able to attack German fighters when they were least prepared for it, like
when they were taking off or forming up in the air. What made this possible was the
increase in the number of American planes present in Europe. This increase in the
number of Allied planes compared to the number of German planes continued to the
point that, on D-Day, the Allies used 12,873 aircraft while the Germans were only able
to muster a mere 300. (Overy 77) By using this overwhelming numerical advantage, the
Allied fighters were able to swamp their opponents in an unstoppable flood of planes.

P-51's Disrupt Luftwaffe Fighter Tactics
This increase in the number of fighters plus the change in fighter philosophy allowed the
escorts to cover the bombers while simultaneously ranging far from the bomber stream
and destroying all that they could find.

This caused the disruption of several effective German fighter tactics that had been
used successfully in the past. One of these tactics was the deployment of slow,
ungainly German planes that would fly around the bomber formations, out of gun range,
and report back on where the bombers were and where their weak spots were. The
free-ranging P-51's soon wiped out these planes. Another popular tactic was to mount
rocket launchers on the wings of some of these slower craft, have them linger just out
of range of the bombers' guns, and send rockets flying into the bomber formations.
These rocket attacks were terrifying to the bomber crews, and often broke up
formations, sending some planes to the ground. Obviously, these attacks also came to
a halt. Most importantly, the fast German fighters had to change their attack tactics.
Beforehand, they would fly alongside the formations and wait for the right moment to
swoop in and attack a bomber.

Now, they were forced to group together several miles away from the bombers, and
then turn and made a mad rush at the bombers, hoping to inflict sufficient damage on
one pass to shoot down some number of enemy bombers. They could not afford to stay
with the bombers for very long for fear of being attacked by the Mustangs. (Perret
293) Indeed, soon after the P-51's entered onto the scene, Hermann Goering, the
commander of the Luftwaffe, recommended that the German defensive fighters avoid
combat with the P-51, and only attack bomber formations when there were no fighters
around. The result of all of this is that the American fighters, led by the P-51's, soon
began to gain air superiority. Not long after Goering's recommendation, a sarcastic
Luftwaffe officer commented that the safest flying in the world was to be an American
fighter over Germany. (Dupuy 35-36) It is obvious that the P-51, once it was supplied
to the Eighth Air Force in great quantities, and unleashed by Doolittle and Arnold's new
fighter policies, soon took a heavy toll on German air superiority.

P-51's Give Bombers Better Support
Another profound effect that the increased fighter coverage had was on the most
important people, the bombers. After the entrance of the P-51, and the virtual
elimination of the German fighter threat, the bombers were in much less danger from
German fighters. The result of the decreased danger to the bombers is subtle, but
obvious when thought about. Imagine a bomber crew sitting in their cramped plane,
unable to move around or evade attack during their bombing run while numerous
German fighters speed past their plane firing at them. Second lieutenant William Brick,
the bombardier of a B-17 bomber, tells about the day he flew to Linz, Austria on a
bombing run:

. . . The remainder of the run must be perfectly straight and level, without the slightest
deviation, or our five-thousand-pound bomb load will fall wide of the target. No evasive
action is possible. . . Then comes the sickening rattle of machine-gun bullets and
cannon fire hitting our ship; ignoring the flak from the antiaircraft batteries, German
fighter planes zoom in so close that it seems they will ram us. . . Even at the sub-zero
temperatures of this altitude, salty sweat pours down my face and burns my eyeballs.
Cursing and praying, I am gripped by the same brand of helpless fear that fliers
experience during every bomb run. I feel the terror in my hands, in my stomach, even in
my feet. Long after returning from the mission, its effects will remain etched indelibly on
my face. . . . (Brick 61)

This kind of terror experienced by the entire crew of the bombers was sure to affect
their concentration and their carefulness. Indeed, "it is an undeniable, if unquantifiable,
fact that it is easier to bomb precisely when you know you will probably not be shot
out of the sky." (Boyne 341)

Conclusion
In the end, the way that the Allied air forces gained air superiority was by destroying
its opposition. The ways in which the fighters were able to destroy German fighters
were diverse. The fighters utilized their high speed and maneuverability to fly low-level
strafing missions that ranged over large expanses of territory and destroyed many
Luftwaffe craft on the ground. This tactic was responsible for the destruction of many
dozens of fighters that were unable to go on and fight in the air. Another way that the
Allied fighters destroyed their opposition, and the most important way, was by luring
them into the air. Going back to the hornets' nest analogy, the Allies stopped pushing
the stick and decided to bide their time until the moment was right. When they did
start pushing the stick into the nest again, they were armed with a metaphoric
insecticide. In real life, this "insecticide" was the P-51. Beforehand, the Allies had
nothing that could stop the "hornets" and so were helpless to stop their attack. But
after they had developed an "insecticide" capable of killing the "hornets," they
proceeded to lure the hornets into the open where they could be destroyed.

In real life, the bombers were the lure that brought the Luftwaffe into the air. Using the
long-range Mustangs, the Allies were able to make their bombing raids more effective
and more deadly to Germany. The approaching end of the Third Reich was enough to
get the German fighters into the air to try to stop the bombers from wrecking their war
effort. "Air superiority had been won not by bombing the enemy's factories into oblivion;
instead, it was won by the long-range fighter, using the bomber formations as bait to
entice the Luftwaffe to fight." (Boyne 338) With the advent of great numbers of the
highly superior P-51 Mustang, the German fighters that came up to attack the bombers
quickly met their match and were easily repelled by the Mustangs.

Works Cited
Bailey, Ronald H. The Air War in Europe. Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1979. A
simple, straight-forward book that includes much background on the development of
military aviation, and includes many pictures that chronicle the air war.
Boyne, Walter J. Clash of Wings: World War II in the Air. New York: Simon & Schuster,
1994. A very informative and user- friendly book that dealt with the air aspect of all
fronts and theaters of WWII. It includes much data on numerous planes in its
appendices.
Brick, William. "Bombardier." American History, April 1995, pp. 60-65. A short magazine
article following the story of how a U.S. airman was shot down over Austria, and his
subsequent imprisonment by the Nazis.
Copp, DeWitt S. Forged in Fire: Strategy and Decisions in the Airwar over Europe,
1940-1945. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1982. A book dealing mostly
with the U.S. involvement in the War, with particular emphasis on the politics of the
military officials, and how the major strategic decisions were made.
Dupuy, Trevor Nevitt. The Air War in the West: June 1941 to April 1945. New York:
Franklin Watts, Inc., 1963. A short, very basic book that did not go into depth, but did
cover its material well.
Grant, William Newby. P-51 Mustang. London: Bison Books Limited, 1980. A relatively
short book, but one that dealt solely with the P-51, and went into considerable depth
concerning its construction and use during WWII and in later conflicts.
Overy, R.J. The Air War: 1939-1945. New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1980. A
fairly dry book that dealt mostly with the economics and generalities of the air war,
without dealing too much with the actual fighting.
Perret, Geoffrey. Winged Victory: The Army Air Forces in World War II. New York:
Random House, 1993. A good book that covered its topic well, although in-depth
discussion of the contributions of the other allies' forces is not dealt with.