1. Can the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) justifiably claim

to be 'the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.'?

The PLO was set up in 1964 by an Arab League decision in response

to growing signs of Palestinian unrest. The Palestinians desired to reclaim

the lands occupied by Israel, which they felt belonged to them, as said in

the Bible. In 1964 the Arab states created the Palestine Liberation

Organization (PLO). While it was supposed to represent the Palestinians,

in reality it represented the views of President Nasser of Egypt, who

guided the formation of the PLO. Its first leader made wild and

irresponsible threats to drive Israelis into the sea, and had little

support among Palestinians for he was seen as a puppet of the Egyptians. In

the 1960s Palestinian students began to form their own organizations

independent of control by Arab governments (although the Syrians, Libyans,

and Iraqis continued to fund and control particular groups). Yasser Arafat

founded an independent Palestinian-run party called Fatah. He is said to

have the backing, for most of the recent past, of about 80% of the

Palestinian people. The position of the Arab governments was that a PLO

under Arab League supervision would be the best way of satisfying the

demands made by an emerging Palestinian national consciousness. Also, it

was felt that through such an organization Arab governments could control

Palestinian political activities.

Ten years after its founding, the PLO was raised to the status of

government. And in 1988, the PLO's status was to be raised again, this

time to a state in exile. After several negotiations, Arafat became a

Terrorist leader and administrator of self-rule in the West Bank and the

Gaza Strip.

In the 1967 Six Day War, the Arab armies did very badly against

Israel, losing 67,000 square kilometres of land. Palestinians came to

believe that if they were ever to have their land, they would have to do it

themselves. After the 1967 war, the situation changed drastically. The

resistance activities of various guerrilla organizations, in particular the

Al-Fatah and the PFLP, gained the increasing support of the Palestinians.

With Arafat at the helm from 1969 and a resistance-oriented leadership, the

PLO was more effective and played a central role in mobilizing the

Palestinians and in expanding its basis of support both at the local and

international level. The PLO became an umbrella organization for the

various guerrilla groups.

This increase in support was made possible because of the

Al-Fatah's ability to access to the growing numbers of volunteers from

refugee camps which were freshly swollen due to the 1967 war. Most of these

refugees suffered the frustration of having been displaced twice in a

lifetime. This generated, especially among the young, a mood of defiance,

as they were ready to question the credibility of the idea of relying on

Arab governments to liberate Palestine. Furthermore, as a consequence of

the war a large proportion of the Palestinian community became

territorially united. This brought the possibility of direct interaction

between the various sections of the Palestinian community that had

previously remained isolated from each other. On the other hand, the

inability of the PLO's conservative leadership to promote any effective

resistance operations culminated in the eventual transfer of power to the

armed-struggle orientated guerrilla organizations. Thus initially, the

PLO had a broad base of support and represented the desires of the majority

of the Palestinian people.

The origins of the Al-Fatah can be traced back to the mid-1950s to

a group of Palestinians that had neither relinquished their national

identity nor their belief in the necessity of liberating Palestine via

Palestinian means, rather than relying on other Arab states. Yet,

throughout the 1950s the attitude of the Palestinians remained largely

skeptical if not uncommitted to Al-Faith's ideology. It was in the 1960s

that the situation began to change, enabling Al-Fatah to expand its

organizational structure and base. Under the leadership of Arafat,

Al-Fatah pursued an ideology which simply stresses the nationalist struggle

to liberate Palestine without dwelling too deeply on any theoretical

speculations about the nature and form of the future Palestinian society.

This tactic was essential in gaining support against other movements, and

aided the rise of Al-Fatah to become the dominating faction within the PLO.

Militarily, the PLO has a broad base of human resources for

recruitment, almost half a million. The PLO has established

across-the-board conscription for all the Palestinian men between the ages

of 18 and 30. As a result, the PLO is able to maintain three military

forces. It could be said then that physically, it did indeed represent a

cross-section of the population. However, even if they were significant in

number, these lower-level members were not politically potent, and did not

have their voices heard. Arafat continued on his policies, tending to

brush aside differing opinions, leaving many disenchanted with his

autocratic rule.

Even before the PLO was declared a state in 1988, it functioned

much like one. This was reflected in much of the powers it possessed. The

PLO has been able to exert what amounts to sovereign powers over the

Palestinian people in war situations. The PLO represented the Palestinians

in wars with Jordan and Lebanon, and during various incursions into Israel.

The PLO also exercises extradition powers, as on many occasions

Arab governments have turned over to the PLO Palestinians charged with

criminal activities. They were tried and sentenced by the PLO judicial

system. In these ways, it was supposed to represent the people.

But various problems within the PLO undermined its legitimacy as

the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Arafat's ascendancy to

power on the Palestinian issue had naturally provoked rivals to try the

same tack in their own interest. As a result, maintenance of his

supremacy within the PLO became Arafat's full time preoccupation. Far

from laying the basis for secular or democratic institutions that one day

might serve as a nation, Arafat recruited Sumni Muslims like himself into a

body known as Fatah, loyal to him on confessional lines.

Unity itself was a mere appearance, a show for the sake of

recovering honour. Far from uniting behind the Palestinian cause as words

might indicate, every Arab state in practice discriminated against

Palestinians living in its midst and had differing slants upon the PLO.

This was due to its nature as an umbrella organization, the PLO comprises a

number of resistance organizations. These organizations entered the PLO as

groups retaining their ideological and organizational identity.

Consequently, PLO institutions are structured to reflect proportional

representation of each organization in addition to the few independent

members. This has turned PLO politics into coalition politics.

The flux of events between 1967 and 1982 offered Palestinians

several chances to demonstrate en masse in favour of the PLO, if they had

been so inclined. But they refrained, not due to fatalism or cowardice,

but because they may be willing to pay lip service to Arafat, not much more

than that.

Whether Palestinians outside the Occupied Territories would in fact

accept the legitimacy of the PLO as their representative was put to test in

Jordan in 1970. Jordanian frontiers were the result of British map-making,

which left half of the country's inhabitants Palestinian by origin. The

rapid financing and arming by Arab power holders of Arafat's mercenaries

offered these Palestinians in Jordan a chance to repudiate King Hussein and

declare themselves nationalists for the new cause. Unexpectantly, Arafat's

power challenge threatened to replace King Hussein with a PLO state in

Jordan. After 18 months, while tensions were running high, the PFLP

hijacked international airliners, three of which were brought at gunpoint

to Jordan. Taking advantage of this anarchic jockeying between rival

Palestinian groups, King Hussein ordered his army to subjugate the whole

movement. Palestinians in Jordan and on the West Bank gave evidence of

their real feelings by denouncing the PLO and PFLP activists to the

authorities and occasionally even helping to round them up.

David Pryce-Jones observed that "wherever they live, they observe

for themselves that the PLO is a means to enrichment and aggrandizement for

the unscrupulous few, but death and destruction for everyone else".

Everywhere Palestinians have little alternative but to cling to this

identity, as they continue to seek what freedom they can from power holders

of different identity. In Syria, any Palestinian who attempted to form

some independent grouping would be seen as a dangerous conspirator and

summarily disposed of. This left many with no choice but to remain

silent.

Fatah itself was split by power struggles initiated by a growing

number of young Fatah activists who were trying to gain positions of power

in local society, in the process challenging the older generation of Fatah

leaders. They felt entitled to positions in the structures Arafat was

trying to create. The newest generation of people not only refuse to be

cajoled or coerced, but also have acquired political organizing and

networking skills in neighbourhoods, refugee camps, Israeli jails, and

above all, in the political bodies created during the Intifada (uprising).

The problem of factionalism has plagued the PLO from its formation.

However, instead of adopting a policy of inclusion to accommodate the

general goals of the people, he excluded not only the opposition but also

the local Palestinians who had acted as his proxies before his return. He

had promised he would be the leader of all Palestinians, but acted only

like the President of his trusted lieutenants. Instead of speaking of

tolerance and political pluralism, he spoke of respect for his authority.

On top of this, Arafat's leadership was questioned. Arafat was

criticized for filling his posts with loyalists whose professional

qualifications are below average and whose reputations are tarnished.

Other appointments brought more and more Palestinians to the conclusion

that Arafat was mired in the past, and that he would continue to follow the

policy plans he had formed long ago.

The Chairman's primacy within the PLO had been seriously

compromised as a result of the secret negotiations that had led to the

September 13, 1993 agreement with the Rabin government. The relationship

with the masses that the charismatic Arafat had enjoyed was diminished by

the concessions he made to Israel.

In modern day politics, he still remains a symbol of Palestinian

nationalism, as does the PLO. But he faces much opposition. On the left

various socialist groups think Arafat is too close to business and banking

interests and too willing to negotiate with Israel or cooperate with

America. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is one of these.

It is led by George Habash, a Christian doctor. It opposes any

negotiations. On the right some Islamic groups feel the PLO is too willing

to cooperate with socialists and is too willing to negotiate with Israel.

They feel there should be a united Palestine where Jews could live but

which would not be governed by Jews. The largest of these groups is called

HAMAS, the Islamic Resistance Movement. Several Palestinian radicals have

their own military organizations. Abu Nidal is one of these. He is bitterly

and violently opposed to the PLO for what he sees as its moderate

positions. He has carried out airplane bombings and attacks on civilians

and has tried to assassinate Arafat. He opposes any negotiation with

Israel. He is probably funded by Iraq.

In the latest turn of events, Yasser Arafat has decided to scrap

the anti-Israeli section of the PLO charter calling for its destruction.

Some have said that this is due to Israeli pressure in the peace process,

which demanded the change before new talks and settlements. Shimon Peres

has called it the "most important ideological change of the century", but

it is sure to upset the Islamic fundamentalists, and those in the PLO who

desire a completely pro-PLO solution. While there is so much contention

and opposition to PLO decisions, the PLO cannot be called the sole

representative of the Palestinian people, although it has a large

following.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. David Pryce-Jones: The Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs

Harper Perennial, New York, 1991

2. Peter Calrocovessi: World Politics since 1945 (5th Ed)

Longman Group, New York, 1987

3. Kamal Kirisai: The PLO and World Politics

Frances Pinter, London, 1986

4. Muhammad Muslih : Arafat's Dilemma

Mr Kwok's notes