The argue for the existence of an objective morality based entirely on rational and scientific reasoning. By "objective morality" I do not simply mean that morality exists in the sense that various

societies consider various actions to be immoral. What I mean is that certain actions are inherently right or wrong regardless of what any society thinks about them. In other words, I mean that there is an "objective morality" which exists independently of human beliefs and human civilization. There are many people who have the opinion that it is not possible to believe in such an objective morality without also believing in concepts such as God or an eternal soul. I believe that they are wrong. I will attempt to show that an objective morality exists and that this morality is the same regardless of which religion, if any, is correct.

Many people believe that without a religious framework, the only possible conclusion is that all morality is

nothing more than a human construct without any objective existence. In other words, what morality a person

or a culture accepts is like picking a favorite flavor of ice cream. Some individuals prefer strawberry ice

cream, other individuals prefer chocolate, and no person s preference is "more correct" than another s. In a

similar manner, they argue, different individuals and different societies have various favorite moral belief

systems, and just as with ice cream, no particular set of moral beliefs is "more correct" than any other.

A common argument for this type of thinking is the following. Throughout history, different cultures have had

vastly different moral systems. In fact, on almost any moral issue, it appears that there is absolutely no

agreement or consensus shared by even a majority of the cultures throughout history. In addition to this, there

appears to be no way to prove the superiority of one moral system over another using logic alone. So the

only way in which one moral system can actually be the correct one is if religion is the tie breaker. That is,

whichever value system the "correct religion" advocates is the correct value system. Otherwise, there is no

way to decide between them.

I believe that this type of argument is easily refuted. In order to argue for the existence of an objective

morality, I will have to do more than just point out the flaws in lines of reasoning such as this. I will have to

provide my own arguments that an objective morality does exist, and I will have to discuss where this morality

"comes from". I will also have to explain a process by which we can attempt to determine what it is. This is

what I intend to do. I would first, though, like to take some time to point out some of the errors in the

reasoning above. There are two points that the argument above makes. The first regards the lack of

consensus regarding morality. The second involves the inability to prove the superiority of one moral system

over another using logic alone.

It is true that throughout history, different cultures have held vastly different beliefs about morality. These

cultures have also held vastly different beliefs regarding natural physical laws. Consider, for example, the

belief in gravity. Currently, it is believed that the phenomena which we call gravity is the result of the fact that

objects with mass cause a curvature in "space-time". Under this framework, we believe that a clock located

in a high gravitational field will appear to run slower than an identical clock in a region with low gravity. We

also believe, under this framework, that the path of something without mass, such as a beam of light, is

affected by gravity. This was not always the case. At the beginning of the twentieth century, for example, it

was believed that the phenomena of gravity is the result of the fact that all objects with mass exert an

attractive force on each other. According to this view, the path of a beam of light should be unaffected by

gravity and identical clocks should run at the same speed everywhere. This had not always been the case

either. At an earlier time it was believed that the natural place for objects such as rocks was on the ground

while the natural place for things like steam was up in the sky. According to this perspective, rocks fell to the

ground while steam rose because everything tends to go to its natural place. If we do a more thorough

examination, including all the cultures throughout all of history, we will find an even larger variety of opinions

regarding the law of gravity.

This does not, though, mean that there is no objective law of gravity which exists independently of human

society. The beliefs in gravity which I described are attempts by human societies to approximate reality.

Clearly, some approximations are better than others. Perhaps the current belief in the curvature of space-time

is also incorrect and will later be replaced by an even better approximation. However, most people would

have no problem agreeing that the curvature of space-time explanation of gravity is a better approximation to

reality than the explanations which came before it.

All that this shows is that even though different cultures hold very different beliefs about a certain issue, this

does not necessarily imply that there is no objective reality behind these beliefs. The claim which I will be

arguing for is that this is the same for morality as it is for gravity. All the moral beliefs which came before us

and all the moral beliefs today are, in exactly the same way as in the case of gravity, approximations to the

objective reality which exists independently of human beings. Although probably none of these

approximations correspond to reality exactly, as with gravity, some approximations are better than others.

For example, the value system of a society which condones slavery but condemns cannibalism is incorrect,

but it is a better approximation to reality than that of a society which condones both slavery and cannibalism.

The claim that no one has yet been able to prove the correctness of a particular moral system through logic

alone is also correct. However, if we continue the analogy with gravity, we will realize that no one has also

been able to prove the existence of gravity through logic alone either. The reason we believe that a rock will

fall to the ground is because that is what we have always observed when we have let go of rocks in the past.

There is a little more to it than that, of course, but not much. Our current theory of gravity predicts many

specific phenomena. These include rocks falling to the ground, planets orbiting the Sun, the creation of ocean

tides by the moon, and identical clocks running at different speeds. The only reason why we do believe in our

current theory of gravity is because every time we have observed these phenomena, what we saw

corresponded with what the theory predicted. If we were deprived of these observations, we would have no

reason to believe in gravity at all. There is no way, using logic alone, that a person can prove the existence of

gravity or the superiority of one theory of gravity to another. It is only by using logical reasoning in

combination with observation that a person can argue for the existence of gravity. Even then, it is not be

possible to do so with total 100% assurance. The fact that the current theory of gravity has always made

correct predictions in the past does not guarantee that the theory will give correct predictions tomorrow.

What a person can do, though, is to show, by using logical reasoning in combination with observations, that

our theory of gravity is most likely true.

This is what I intend to do for morality. There are, of course, some differences in arguing for an objective

moral law and an objective gravitational law. Perhaps one of the most significant is that it is possible to

construct equipment which quantitatively measure the effects of gravity. That is, it is possible to construct a

speed detector that tells you that a rock is moving with a velocity of ten meters per second at a certain

moment in time. On the other hand, it is not currently possible to construct a morality meter which tells you

that a certain action is wrong with an immorality of ten immorality units. Nevertheless, this is an obstacle

which I believe can easily be overcome. I will explain the way in which I overcome this obstacle a little bit

later. For now, I would just like to point out that the fact that we can not build such a detector does not

automatically imply that an objective morality does not exist. It was not that long ago that we were unable to

detect or measure the existence of electrons. This, however, does not imply that electrons did not exist in that

time period. Electrons (objectively) existed regardless of whether or not we could build devices which

detected them. The same, I believe, is true for morality.

I have divided my discussion into four parts. The first part is this introduction. In the second part, I attempt to

show that it is objectively wrong to torture another person for pleasure, and I discuss where this objective

morality "comes from". In this second part, I do not deal with something even as mildly complicated as

torturing one person to prevent the suffering of another. Since I am trying to show that an objective morality

exists independently of human beliefs, just showing that there exists one action which is objectively wrong

should be sufficient to demonstrate my position that some objective morality exists.

However, just believing that an objective morality exists should not be enough to satisfy anyone s inquiry into

the matter. In part three, I discuss how we can determine what this objective morality says about

controversial moral issues. As in the case of gravity, I only claim to have a method to find good

approximations to this objective moral law, not to get it exactly right the first time. By spending more time

applying this method to a particular moral issue, we will obtain better approximations. I give examples of how

this method can be applied to issues such as abortion, war, animal rights, and forcing your morality on others.

I also discuss if an action which does not harm anyone can be immoral and if it is ever correct to say that one

life is "worth more" than another. In addition, I give a method for establishing a belief about if another being

possesses consciousness, which is useful in attempting to determine if we have an obligation to act morally

towards that being.

The fourth part is relatively independent of the rest of my discussion. In part four, I briefly discuss other

alternative views about the nature and origin of morality. I touch on several topics. I discuss how a belief in

God can be reconciled with the position which I advocate and why I think that it is not logically consistent to

hold the opinion that a belief in God is necessary in order to believe in an objective morality. I discuss moral

systems based on ideas like karma and perfect justice which are often associated with reincarnation. I also

discuss a few other views regarding morality and what I think their flaws are. I talk about what I think is

wrong with thinking of morality as just a social behavior which evolved to help our survival. I also discuss why

I think that it is not possible to successfully base the foundation of a society on self interest or a social

contract. I also mention why morality is much more than simply attempting to maximize a certain quantity such

as happiness. Nowhere in my presentation do I discuss whether any particular religion is correct or incorrect.

I limit my presentation to discussing the development of a belief in an objective morality without appealing to

religious teachings. I do, though, show how my position can be reconciled with various religious beliefs. I also

show how the definition of morality which I am about to give can be reconciled with the theory of evolution

and natural selection. In addition, I discuss if moral beliefs improve in the long run with the passage of time.

My definition of the word "morality" does not correspond to the way in which the word is usually used, but I

believe that this definition closely approximates what "morality" is. In order to better explain my definition, I

would first like to give an example of what "morality" is not.

Suppose that a man comes home after shopping for food at a supermarket. When his son sees him, he

comments on what good and moral people the owners of the supermarket must be. He remarks that the store

owners must have been very kind and generous to give all this food to his family. How do you think that his

father will answer? Clearly, the father will answer that the supermarket owners did not give him the food

because they were kind or generous people, but because it was in their self interest to do so. Although the

store owners might indeed be good and moral people, this action is in no way any indication of this. They did

what they did because they believed that the action would profit them, and for no other reason. This action,

the father would conclude, says nothing about the morality of the store owners.

I will now give my definition. All actions can be placed into one of two categories. Some actions can belong

to both of these groups simultaneously. However, all actions must belong to at least one of these categories.

The first group consists of all actions which we do out of self interest while not harming others. Simple

examples of this are riding a bicycle or watching television. These are activities which we engage in because

we believe that these activities will benefit us. If an action belongs exclusively to this category, then it is of the

same type as that of the supermarket owners in the previous example, and has nothing to do with morality.

The second group consists of two types of behavior. The first type is behavior which either harms or intends

to harm others. The second type is behavior which we engage in, not because we believe that it will somehow

benefit us in the long run, but because we believe that it will benefit others. This includes any action we do,

and any action which we refrain from doing, not for ourselves, but for others. It is with this second group of

behaviors with which morality is concerned. Morality, then, is engaging in behavior, not out of self interest, but

because it is in the interest of others. This is how I define morality.

Many people would argue that altruistic actions belonging to the second group which I described do not exist.

That is, they would argue that every action every person does is done out of self interest. If a man gives

money to charity, they say, he does so only because he gets a warm and fuzzy feeling inside. If a woman

donates blood, it is only because doing so makes her feel good about herself. This line of reasoning claims

that all these seemingly benevolent actions are really done out of self interest. That is, people engage in such

activities only to get these good internal feelings which they want.

I disagree with such thinking. Although it is correct that a woman who gives to charity will probably obtain a

warm and fuzzy feeling from doing so, it is incorrect to assume that this is the only reason why she engages in

this activity. This is an example of an action which can simultaneously fit both of the groups which I described.

That is, this woman may be giving to charity both because she feels good after doing so and because she

wants to help others. In this case, so long as it is not done entirely out of self interest, it is still related to

morality. Some actions which people engage in fall exclusively into my second category, and could never be

explained in terms of self interest. An extreme example of this is when a person, who does not believe in an

afterlife, makes a split second decision to give up his life for others, as in a case of a soldier throwing his body

on a live hand grenade in order to save his comrades. There is no way to argue that the soldier is doing this

because he seeks a warm and fuzzy feeling inside, since he is not going to live long enough to enjoy it.

Human beings often attempt to persuade others into behaving a certain way by pointing out that it is in their

self interest to do so. A police officer may say, for example, that you shouldn t steal because there is a good

chance that you will go to jail if you do. Similarly, a mother may tell her son that he will be punished if he his

found misbehaving. None of this, though, in any way influences anyone to become a moral person. It just tells

people how to behave in their own self interest. The only lesson this would impart on the child is that if he

wants to avoid punishment, he should not misbehave. This will not prevent him from misbehaving the moment

he knows that his parents aren t watching, or after he grows up and moves out of his parents house.

Similarly, this type of reasoning will not convince a person not to steal if he finds himself in a situation where

the chances of being caught are small or non-existent. Nor is there, based on self interest alone, much reason

for police officers, judges, and law makers to not abuse the power of their positions.

What religions often do with regards to morality is to argue that it is always in a person s self interest to

behave "morally". Some religions teach, for example, that if you engage in murder, rape, or torture, you will

go to Hell. Others teach that if you engage in such activities you are going to have a very unfortunate next

reincarnation. Others may believe that there is no life after death, but that you will be punished in this life for

engaging in improper acts. However, this does not really tell anyone to be a moral person. This, again, just

tells people how to behave in their self interest. If a woman refrains from killing other people only because she

does not want to go to Hell, or if a man gives to charity only because he does not want to be reincarnated as

an insect, then these activities have nothing to do with morality. As in the case of the supermarket owner,

these people are just acting in their self interest. A religious person can, of course, be acting morally if he

engages in activities for the purpose of benefiting others as well as seeking a reward. It is just that, as with the

supermarket owner, although an action may have the side effect of benefiting other people, it is not related to

morality if seeking a reward or avoiding a punishment is the only motivation.

But then the questions before us are the following. Without making an appeal to religion, why is it that we

"should" behave "morally"? Why is it that we "should" engage in activities which benefit others and refrain

from activities which harm others? In a situation where which course of action is moral is itself a matter of

debate, how is it possible, without using religious concepts, to persuasively argue that a particular answer is in

fact the correct one. It is these types of questions which I will attempt to answer.

Let us suppose that we were attempting to use logic alone in order to convince a skeptic that torturing

another person for pleasure is (objectively) immoral. We could say that torturing another person for pleasure

is immoral because it inflicts suffering unnecessarily. However, this skeptic could then ask why it is that

inflicting needless suffering is immoral. In order to answer this question, we would first have to explain what

suffering feels like. After all, if a person does not know what suffering feels like, then he will never understand

why it is wrong to inflict it. However, how would we go about explaining what suffering "feels like"?

We could talk about the facial expressions or the verbal sounds which the prisoner will make. However, this

is not really describing what suffering feels like, since an actor can produce exactly the same symptoms

without feeling any suffering, and since it is possible to feel suffering while not displaying any of these

characteristics. We can talk about phenomena such as an increased heart beat or respiration. However, this

does not tell us what suffering feels like either, since it is also possible to have these symptoms without

suffering and to suffer without showing these symptoms. We could attempt to describe suffering as the firing

of a particular group sensory neurons in a particular way. However, this too will not give us the answer we

seek. We could remove those neurons and place them in a test tube. Having those sensory neurons fire in

exactly the same way in the laboratory would not involve any suffering. Simply knowing that these sensory

neurons are firing, or knowing any of these mentioned measurable physical characteristics, would not really

tell us what suffering "feels like".

The problem is analogous to attempting to describe to a blind man what the color green looks like. We could

explain to him that light is a type of electromagnetic wave. We could then tell him that "green" is light with a

certain range of frequencies. We could then also talk about which objects absorb green light and which

objects reflect green light. However, none of this would get a blind man any closer to understanding what

"green" looks like. The only way we can currently describe to a person what a color looks like is by

comparing it to other colors. We might say, for example, that "green" is a cross between yellow and blue.

However, this is of no use to a blind man since he does not know what yellow or blue look like either.

This is exactly the problem we face in attempting to tell the skeptic what suffering feels like. We could attempt

to explain what the tortured victim is feeling by comparing it to feelings of suffering which the skeptic has

experienced in the past. However, a proof based only on logic can not make appeals to past experiences or

to sensations. If we wanted to use only logic to prove that it is immoral to inflict needless suffering, we would

have to be able to explain what suffering "feels like" using logic alone also. This, however, is not currently

possible. It is only here that an attempt to use logic alone to prove the existence of an objective morality

breaks down. This does not mean, though, that we can not use a slightly different method to argue for the

existence of an objective morality.

There are two different ways we can go about explaining the probable truth of a statement. The first is by

explaining why we believe that the statement is true. The second is by attempting to explain what causes the

statement to be true. Take, for example, the statement, "the sky looks blue". Explaining why we believe that

this statement is true is fairly simple. We look up at the sky, and we see that it looks blue. Explaining what

causes this is statement to be true turns out to be much more difficult. This would require explaining that light

is a type of wave and explaining the properties of wave propagation. Only then would we really understand

"why" it is that light having the frequency associated only with the color blue reaches our eyes when we look

at the daytime sky.

I will attempt to look at the statement "An objective morality exists" from both of these perspectives. That is, I

will talk about why we should believe that the statement is true and about what causes the statement to be

true. However, as the previous example shows, it is possible to know why we should believe that a statement

is probably true without knowing what causes it to be true. The vast majority of people know that the sky

looks blue, and why it is that we should believe that the sky looks blue, while they at the same time have

almost no knowledge of wave propagation.

I will first discuss what "causes" the statement "An objective morality exists" to be true. My claim is that it is

not necessary to believe in concepts like God or an eternal soul in order to believe in an objective morality.

One of the main reasons so many people initially have a hard time accepting such a claim is because one of

the most popular alternative views is that we are nothing more than a congregation of atoms and molecules. In

other words, the most popular alternative view is that our consciousness is nothing more than complicated

electrochemical reactions in the brain. If such a view is correct, they say, an objective morality can not

possibly exist. After all, there is no morality when it comes to the physical laws governing the behavior of

atoms and molecules. Our laws of physics just tell us which way an electron will go. These laws appear to say

nothing about if it is "immoral" for an electron to go in a particular direction. So if we are nothing more than

just a congregation of such particles, where could an objective morality come from?

I do not claim that such a view regarding consciousness is correct. I do claim, though, that an objective

morality exists even if this type of view regarding consciousness does turn out to be correct. It is true that

there appears to be no morality on the level of atoms and molecules. However, in exactly the same manner,

there is also no consciousness on the level of atoms and molecules. It is not possible for an electron to feel

happiness, joy, or sorrow. Just as the laws of physics seem to say nothing about morality, they also seem to

say nothing about consciousness. The people who want to believe that conscious results from brain activity

have to conclude that, although there appears to be no consciousness in the laws of physics on the atomic

level, consciousness does arise through the complicated interactions of these atoms and molecules according

to physical laws. If this turns out to be the case, then it certainly does not seem to be any less plausible that in

exactly the same way, although there appears to be no morality in the laws of physics on the atomic level,

morality does arise through the complicated interactions of these atoms and molecules according to physical

laws. This, so far, does not actually say that an objective morality must exist. It just says that having morality

arise from physical laws is no more or less plausible than having consciousness arise from physical laws in

exactly the same way.

Some people have trouble imagining how it is that a congregation of atoms, which we call a human being, can

possibly have a property such as an obligation to act morally, which does not also exist on the atomic level.

There are many analogies which can help to illustrate this. One is a wave traveling down a rope. If you look

very closely at any of the individual atoms in the rope, you will not find this "wave" of the rope in any of these

rope atoms at any given time. It is only when you stand back and look at the entire rope that you can see this

wave and the properties by which it travels. This does not, however, imply that this wave does not arise from

the basic laws governing the motion of the rope atoms. Another analogy is a neon sign. A detailed analysis of

the individual atoms in the sign will never tell you that the sign spells "Joe s Diner". I would like to say again

that I am not trying to argue that human beings are just a collection of atoms and molecules. I am just pointing

out that a belief in an objective morality is perfectly consistent with such a view.

The analogy between morality and consciousness is not as arbitrary as it might first appear. If we really

wanted to know what could cause a statement such as "Inflicting suffering on another person for pleasure is

immoral" to be true, we would first have to understand the nature and origin of suffering. This is because it

would not be possible to know "why" it is wrong to inflict suffering without knowing what suffering is. As I

mentioned before, suffering from physical pain is not the firing of any particular group of sensory neurons.

Suffering is the way our consciousness interprets the firing of those neurons.

Explaining terms like "tree" or "rainbow" is fairly simple. To explain the term "tree", all you have to do is point

to a tree. To explain what the term "rainbow", all you have to do is point to a rainbow. However, when you

attempt to explain the term "suffering", there is nothing to point to. Suffering is a feeling, and we can not point

to feelings in this manner. "Suffering" is a state of consciousness. "Suffering" can not exist without

consciousness. In order to really understand the nature and origin of suffering, we would have to understand

the nature and origin of consciousness.

As mentioned before, there are some people who believe that consciousness is entirely the result of the

electrochemical reactions occurring in the brain. Others believe that it is the result of a soul which exists

independently of the brain and body. There are many other possible answers to where it is that consciousness

comes from. If it turns out that consciousness is nothing more than electrochemical reactions in the brain, then

we can understand how suffering arises from these electrochemical reactions by understanding how

consciousness arises from such reactions. However, we do not currently understand how consciousness

arises from brain activity, so we can not currently understand how suffering arises from brain activity. If it

turns out that consciousness is the result of something similar to a soul, then we could understand the nature

and origin of suffering by understanding the nature and properties of this soul. Needless to say, we do not

know this either.

It is only for these reasons that we do not yet have a complete answer to what "causes" a statement such as

"It is objectively immoral to inflict suffering just for the heck of it" to be true. Perhaps one day in the future, we

will have a thorough understand what "causes" consciousness. It is only then that we would really know what

the nature and origin of suffering is. It is also only then that we would really know what "causes" it to be

immoral to inflict suffering just for the heck of it.

We do not, though, have to wait till that day to find out if an objective morality exists and what this objective

morality is. As I said before, it is not necessary to understand what causes a phenomena to be true in order to

understand what that phenomena is. For example, in order to understand what path a rock will take when

you throw it, all you have to do is use the classical Newtonian rules of motion which have been known for

some time. If you really wanted an answer to what "causes" the rock to take that path, though, you would

have to understand the way in which the mass of the Earth affects the curvature of "space-time", something

which we knew nothing about before the twentieth century. However, even if you know absolutely nothing

about modern physics, you could still know how to accurately predict the path that a rock will take when you

throw it.

Let us focus once again on the issue of torturing another person for pleasure. Even though we do not

understand the nature and origin of suffering in the manner I described above, we know what suffering is

because we have experienced it ourselves. It is only in understanding what suffering is in this manner that we

come to understand that it is wrong for others to inflict it on us needlessly. This is not the same thing as simply

observing the fact that we dislike the experience of suffering. The only way to understand this difference,

again, is to experience what "dislike" is and what "suffering" is. I do not claim that experiencing suffering will

necessarily cause anyone to realize that it is wrong for them to inflict suffering on others. For now, I am just

claiming that by understanding what suffering is by experiencing a significant amount of it directly, a person

will realize that it is objectively wrong for others to inflict needless suffering on him.

There are many objections which can be raised against this claim. In order to argue for the validity of my

claim, I must do more than simply show why these objections are not valid. Before I proceed, though, I

would like to point out the flaws in several of the most common types of objections people would most likely

have.

A person may ask about the masochists who enjoy experiencing physical pain. Such individuals do exist, and

a person can ask how this can be reconciled with my position. The answer is that suffering is not the same

thing as physical pain. Just as a person does not need to feel physical pain in order to feel suffering, a person

also does not need to feel suffering in order to feel physical pain. If a masochist feels enjoyment when he

experiences physical pain, then clearly he is not feeling suffering during that time period. It is only when the

masochist has an experience which really does cause him to suffer that he will realize that it is wrong for

others to inflict suffering on him for entertainment.

A person can ask how the existence of moral relativists can be reconciled with my position. These are people

who genuinely believe that no objective morality exists. Since they have all experienced suffering in the past,

why do they not believe that it is objectively wrong for others to inflict suffering on them? First, I need to say

that when I referred to "a significant amount suffering", I was not necessarily referring to a tooth ache. For

some people, experiencing a tooth ache is enough. The knowledge of what a tooth ache feels like is enough

to allow them to extrapolate to what the experience of being tortured probably feels like. For others,

experiencing a tooth ache is not enough. There are some people who have been fortunate enough to live a life

without experiencing much suffering.

Nevertheless, there are moral relativists who have experienced a significant amount of suffering in their lives. I

still need to explain how their existence can be reconciled with my position. The answer is that the memory of

experiencing suffering is not the same thing as the experience of suffering itself. The process of recalling the

memory of a tooth ache you had a few months ago does not bring about the same agony as the tooth ache

itself did. For this reason, simply recalling the memory of a painful experience might not be enough. We do

not truly fully appreciate what suffering "is" except for the moment in which we are experiencing it. For some

people, I believe, the memory of having experienced suffering in the past is enough to make them realize that

it is wrong for others to inflict suffering on them just for entertainment. For others, the actual experience is

required. I believe that it would not be possible, for example, to find any moral relativists among the prisoners

of a Nazi death camp. After a few years go by, however, it is perfectly possible that some of the survivors of

this camp will look back on their experience and still become moral relativists.

Another objection which can be raised is the following. It appears that the existence of morality depends on

the existence of conscious beings. If it turns out that consciousness has not always existed in the Universe,

then it appears that morality did not always exist either. It is possible to respond to this objection by again

making the comparison to gravity. You would not see the law of gravity being applied in a region of space

without objects possessing mass. This does not imply that the law of gravity does not exist in that region of

space. In a similar manner, the law of morality still exists in a region of space or in a time period without

conscious beings. We just do not see it being applied.

Another objection which can be raised to my position is that it relies too heavily on personal experience. It

can be pointed out that since my belief that a particular action is "objectively immoral" relies on personal

experience, and since different people have different personal experiences, different people are going to end

up with different moralities. The morality of a person who has almost never experienced suffering, for

example, is going to be very different from the morality of a person who s life has been almost nothing except

suffering. This, it would appear, does not make my morality very objective.

The way to respond to this objection is by recalling the fact that, due to different observations, people in

different time periods have had widely different views about physical laws as well. At one time, for example, it

was believed that gravity results because all objects with mass exert an attractive force on one another.

Today it is believed that gravity results because objects with mass cause a curvature in "space-time". The

reason that people in the 19th century believed differently about gravity than people do today is not because

the people living in the 19th century were less intelligent. It is only because people living in the 19th century

did not have access to the same experimental observations which people had access to in the 20th century.

All science is based on observation, whether it be the observation of a chance occurrence or the observation

of a controlled laboratory experiment. It is perfectly in accordance with the scientific method for a belief to be

based on observation. It is also in accordance with the scientific method for people who have access to

different sets of observation to come to different conclusions. All scientific laws and theories are only

approximations to reality. The greater the number and variety of observations on which a theory is based, the

greater the odds that it better approximates reality.

There are many people, however, who would find fault with this comparison to the scientific method.

Scientific theories, they would argue, are based on repeatable observations which are performed many times

by different observers. It must be possible for these observations to be reproduced by anyone at any time.

My position relies on "personal" observations, they would continue, which do not meet this criteria. Well, let s

check to see if this accusation is true. Are these observations repeatable? Clearly the answer is yes. Dropping

a bowling ball on your foot is probably going to hurt just as much today as it will tomorrow. We can easily

reproduce the experience of suffering for any observer at any given time. I, of course, believe that doing so

would be immoral and would not recommend this course of action. Nevertheless, my argument from an

individual s "personal observations" does meet the reproducibility requirement of scientific observations.

So far, I have not actually provided an argument for my claim. Up till now, I have only shown flaws in various

objections to my claim. Ultimately, the objection which can be raised is that perhaps the only thing which we

really observe when we experience suffering is that we dislike the experience. Perhaps the perception that

something is "objectively wrong" is nothing more than an illusion. After all, we can not construct a device

which measures the "morality" of an action. So why should we believe that "morality" is anything more than a

figment of our imagination? Also, why should my claim be accepted by a person who has never had the

impression that it is wrong for others to inflict suffering on him?

There are two cases I have to address. The first is the case of a person who has felt the impression that it is

objectively wrong for others to needlessly inflict suffering on him, but chose to believe that it was just an

illusion. I have to explain why this person should believe that he was observing more than the simple fact that

he dislikes suffering. The second is the case of a person who claims never to have felt the impression that it is

objectively immoral for others to inflict suffering on him.

I will start with the first case by tackling the issue of the lack of a "morality detector". As I mentioned in the

introduction, it is true that we can not currently construct a measuring device which would indicate to us when

an action is immoral. So it follows that we can not build a measuring device that tells us that it is "objectively

immoral" for another person to torture us. Does this, though, imply that an "objective morality" does not exist?

While attempting to answer this question, it is necessary to keep in mind that we also can not build a

measuring device which detects suffering. We can build instruments which measure the responses of the brain

and body. However, none of these can measure what suffering "feels like". Since suffering is nothing more

than a "feeling", we are just as incapable of measuring suffering with scientific instruments as we are at

measuring morality. Should we, as a result, believe that suffering does not exist? Should we believe that

suffering is nothing more than an illusion? Clearly, the answer is no. Suffering really does exist. We all believe

that it exists in spite of the fact that we can not build measuring devices which indicate this to us. It would not

be consistent for a person to reject as an illusion his "observation" that it is wrong for another person to inflict

needless suffering on him, while at the same time accepting as an objective truth his observation that suffering

exists. If a person rejects one of these conclusions because we do not have such measuring devices, then to

be consistent, he should reject both of these conclusions. Similarly, if he accepts one of these conclusions as

probably true, he should accept both of these conclusions as probably true. This does not apply to a person

who has never experienced the "observation" that it is wrong for others to inflict suffering on him just for the

heck of it. Here, I am simply referring to a person who has had this experience but afterwards chose to think

of it as an illusion.

At this point, someone may say that he does not believe that there is anything objective about the existence of

suffering either. The experience of suffering, this person might respond, is never identical in any two people.

This, he could continue, prevents suffering from being objective. If this is the case, then we are simply

disagreeing on the use of the word "objective". When I say that a statement is "objectively true", all I mean is

that it is actually the "correct" position. If a patient is experiencing suffering, perhaps no one else will ever

know exactly what he is feeling. Nevertheless, the statement "the patient is experiencing suffering" is an

objectively true statement in the sense that it will remain true regardless of what anyone thinks.

But still, a moral relativist can point out that it is possible that the only thing which we really perceive when we

experience suffering is that we dislike it. Perhaps our senses are simply misleading us to believe that it is

"immoral" for others to inflict suffering on us needlessly. I have to admit that this is a logically consistent

possibility. Nevertheless, we have to put at least some trust in our senses. We should always be aware that

there is a possibility that our senses are deceiving us, and that what we see or hear has no correspondence to

reality. But, in the absence of further information, we should conclude that what our senses tell us probably

has some correspondence to reality. Just as it is a logically consistent possibility that the perception of an

objective morality is an illusion, there are many other things which are also logically consistent possibilities.

Perhaps your entire life is nothing but a dream and no external reality exists. Perhaps the existence of a "free

will" is just an illusion and we have no control over our thoughts or actions. Perhaps the belief that time moves

forward is just an illusion, while in reality it has always been frozen at this instant. These are all logically

consistent possibilities, yet most people do not believe them. In the absence of further information, most

people choose to believe their senses and conclude that there is an external reality, that there is a free will,

and that time does move forward. Similarly, in the absence of further information, a person should choose to

believe his senses and conclude that it is immoral for others to torture him for entertainment.

But what about a person who does not believe in an objective morality and who claims to never have had the

impression that it is wrong for others to inflict suffering on him? Why should anything I have said influence his

position? Well, if I have done nothing else, I hope I have at least demonstrated how the belief that certain

actions are objectively immoral can be reconciled with all of our current scientific beliefs. I think that one of

the main reasons that there are so many moral relativists is that many people, for one reason or another,

believe that the existence of an objective morality is not logically consistent with our current scientific theories.

At the very least, I hope I have dispelled these reservations.

When you debate with another person, it is not actually possibly for "you" to change their mind about a

certain issue. Only they can do this for themselves. All you can do is present them with reasons for them to

change their mind. As an extreme example, let us say that you were debating with a person who believed that

the Earth was flat. You can show him the most recent photographs of the Earth from a space shuttle, but this

will not necessarily convince him. He can still believe that these photographs are a forgery and that there is a

government conspiracy to brainwash the population into believing that the Earth is round. You can not "force"

him to believe in a round Earth. All you can do is present your side of the argument and hope that this will

influence him to rethink his position.

The same is true with morality. Just as it is not possible to "make" a person believe in a round Earth, it is not

possible to "make" a person believe in an objective morality. In the case of the Earth, though, you can draw

the person s attention to the photographs from the space shuttle and hope he will reexamine his beliefs in light

of this. In the case of a person who does not believe that is objectively wrong for others to torture him,

similarly, all you can do is draw the person s attention to his own past experiences of suffering and hope that

this will cause him to rethink his position.

So far, I have only claimed that by understanding what suffering is by experiencing it, a person can realize that

it is objectively wrong for others to torture him. I have not yet shown why this should cause anyone to believe

that it is wrong for them to torture others. This is the issue which I will now address. What is to prevent a

person from believing that it is objectively wrong for others to torture him but that it is perfectly OK for him to

torture others?

Our current scientific beliefs about the world rest on the assumption that the physical laws of the universe do

not change and are the same everywhere. For example, our belief that galaxies are moving away from each

other rests on the assumption that the laws of physics operate the same way in other galaxies as they do in

our own. Otherwise, there would be no way to interpret as "red-shifted" the light which we receive from

those galaxies. The point I am trying to make is that if we choose to reject the assumption that laws which

govern the Universe are the same everywhere and unchanging, then we would have to also reject the vast

majority of our scientific beliefs. So it appears that for the purposes of my argument, this assumption that

these laws are "universal" is a fairly safe assumption to make.

If a person admits that it is objectively immoral for others to torture him, then he is admitting that there is some

external "law" which makes it immoral. Operating under the assumption which I have just mentioned, this law

must continue operating unchanged after a passage of time or a change in location. Therefore, if it is

objectively immoral for another person to torture you, then it must also be immoral for you to torture another

person.

But someone might protest. A person can claim that the two situations are not really the same. In one case, he

is being tortured by another person. In the second, another person is being tortured by him. He could attempt

to claim that this "universal law" only states that it is wrong for others to torture him. Well, what exactly do we

mean when we say that a physical law is the same at all places and at all times? When we say that a rock will

fall to the ground due to gravity, do we mean just that one rock? What if we claimed that this law of gravity

only stated that one particular rock will fall to the ground, while other rocks do not necessarily follow this

pattern due to the fact that they are not the same rock? If this is the case, then our claim that this is a law

which is the same everywhere at all times would be an extremely hollow claim. If this is truly a "universal law"

then it has to apply to all rocks. Similarly, such a "universal law" of morality would have to apply to all people.

Otherwise, it wouldn t be very universal.

There is one problem, though. I claimed that we can only understand what suffering is by experiencing it

ourselves. If this is the case, how can we ever tell if another individual is experiencing suffering? This question

might appear trivial to some people. However, in some controversial moral issues, this question is at the very

heart of the matter. In the case of abortion, for example, whether or not a fetus can feel suffering is sometimes

at the center of the debate. Another example is a debate concerning if we have an obligation to act morally

towards insects. A person s position on such an issue is going to strongly depend on that person s belief

about if insects are capable of suffering. I will leave such questions for part three of my discussion. For now, I

will just focus on how to determine if another healthy adult human being is experiencing suffering. How this

question is answered, though, will play an important role in determining how these other questions are

answered.

Suppose that the prisoner who is going to be tortured is an enemy prisoner of war who does not speak our

language. Also, there is no interpreter around. Let us hypothetically suppose that a person claimed that it is

not immoral to torture this prisoner because this prisoner does not feel any suffering. How can we refute this

claim? In other words, since we only know what suffering feels like by experiencing it ourselves, how can we

determine if this prisoner is experiencing suffering. The answer is that we can never know with 100%

confidence that another individual is experiencing suffering. We can, however, know that another individual is

most probably experiencing suffering.

We know how we would react if we were in the prisoner s position. We know how our body language and

facial expression would react to torture. We know what kind of verbal sounds we would make. We also

know how our heartbeat and various other measurable features would respond to this torture. We also know

that we would suffer. What do we see when we look at this prisoner who is being tortured? We see that his

facial expression and body language is vary similar to what ours would be in that situation. We see that the

verbal sounds, heart beat, and other measurable features of this tortured prisoner very closely resemble how

we ourselves would react. Since all these measurable characteristics are very close to what they would be in

ourselves, then we can argue by induction that the characteristic which we can not measure, that of suffering,

is also probably the same in this prisoner as they would be in ourselves. This is like arguing that if all you

know is that the Sun has risen for the last thousand mornings, then it will probably rise again tomorrow. So

we are able to conclude that this prisoner is most probably suffering as a result of torture, and that therefore it

is immoral for us to continue torturing him.

In summery, an extremely simplified version of my position is the following. Moral laws are of the same nature

as the laws of gravity and heat transfer. It is true that it is not possible to use logic alone to explain why it is

wrong to inflict suffering on another. However, that is only because it is impossible to logically explain what

suffering is. It is only by experiencing suffering ourselves that we can come to understand what suffering is and

the fact that it is wrong to inflict it needlessly. This, however, should not come as a surprise. All science is

based on observation.