The Challenger disaster was not only a disaster in terms of the

destruction of the spacecraft and the death of its crew but also in

terms of the decision-making process that led to the launch and in

terms of the subsequent investigation into the "causes" of the

disaster.

The decision to recommend for launch was made by lower-level

management officials over the objections of technical experts who

opposed the launch under the environmental conditions that existed

on the launch pad at the time. Furthermore, the lower-level

managers who made this decision--both NASA and contractor

personnel--chose not to report the objections of the technical experts

in their recommendations to higher levels in the management chain-

of-command to proceed with the launch. Finally, it seems that the

lower-level managers had also received out-of-the-ordinary

pressure from higher levels of management (some allusions

suggested this pressure may have come all the way from the White

House) to proceed with the launch on time.

The subsequent investigation began with efforts to determine the

technical causes of the explosion of the Challenger. Initially, the

decision-making process leading to the launch was not considered by

investigators. This suggests that the initial purpose of the

investigation was not concerned with ethical issues or issues of

responsibility. As the investigation proceeded, information emerged-

-through leaks to the press--that suggested that NASA had been

aware of the risk of explosion under the environmental conditions

that existed for the Challenger launch for several months prior to the

launch. Also, the opposition of the technical experts to the launch

just prior to the decision to launch became known to the

investigators as well. These two pieces of information changed the

nature of the investigation mid-stream from an effort to determine

the technical cause of the explosion of the spacecraft to an

investigation of the decision-making process leading to the launch.

Viewing the Challenger disaster as an ethical problem would lead to

an effort to determine whether the decision to launch was "right" or

"wrong." Clearly, the explosion was an accident. It may have been

an accident that might have been prevented or anticipated but the

decision to launch was clearly a matter of judgement--albeit of

apparently poor judgement in retrospect--rather than a matter of

"rightness" or "wrongness." As such, an examination of the

Challenger disaster as an ethical problem does little to illuminate the

issue. A more appropriate ethical analysis would seek to understand

the ways in which the decision-making process itself fostered or

hindered responsibility among individuals within the organization

and of the organization itself.

In this respect, when viewed as a problem of responsibility, the

Challenger disaster presents a much more insightful lesson on the

nature of decision-making in a large organization such as NASA.

While it seems clear that the decision that led to the explosion of the

Challenger was made by those lower-level managers who chose to

ignore the objections of technical experts who opposed the launch,

the subsequent investigation revealed how the decision-making

processes within NASA (and it contractors) worked to limit the

agency of decision-makers and to obscure accountability for their

decision-making.

The problem of responsibility in the decision-making process focuses

upon three issues: the availability of information, the role of

technical specifications and formal regulations, and the management

chain-of-command. Each of these factors contributed to the exercise

of poor judgement and to the obscuring of accountability in the

decision-making process.

The availability of information--more precisely the lack of

information--had an impact upon the decision-making process in

three different ways. The technical experts who recommended

against launching were not aware of the nature of the out-of-the-

ordinary pressure upon their managers from higher levels of

management to launch on time. Similarly, the higher-level managers

were not aware of the objections of the technical experts when they

received the recommendation to launch from lower-level managers.

Finally, the lower-level managers, who choose both to ignore the

advice of the technical experts and not to pass those objections along

to their superiors, lacked both an appreciation of the details of the

technical objections to the launch as well as an appreciation of the

nature of the pressure to launch on time. To the extent that each

group lacked complete information, their ability to make decisions

was hampered and their motivation to resort to technical

specifications and formal regulations to resolve issues increased.

The role of technical specifications and formal regulations was

central to the decision-making process. As technical experts and

lower-level managers sought to make decisions with incomplete

information, they turned to technical specifications and formal

regulations to resolve issues. The technical experts were unable to

prove that the Challenger would explode under the environmental

conditions anticipated for launch and thus were repeatedly pressed

by the lower-level managers to provide evidence of the risk from

technical specifications or reason to postpone the launch in formal

procedures. No such specifications or procedures were available.

Similarly, the technical experts, acting with a lack of understanding

about the nature of the pressure upon their superiors to launch on

time, relied upon the formal decision-making procedures when their

objections were overruled and did not report their objections to

higher levels in the management chain-of-command. Thus, the

ability of both groups to act was hampered to the extent they relied

upon technical specification and formal procedures such as the chain-

of-command. Similarly, resorting to specifications and regulations

provided both groups a means to avoid accountability for decisions

that were made on the basis of those specifications and regulations.

The management chain-of-command was the most important aspect

of the decision-making process. No group--technical experts, lower-

level managers, or higher-level managers--ever questioned the

chain-of-command. The technical experts did not choose to express

their objections to the launch outside of the normal channels of the

chain-of-command. Nor did the higher-level managers seek advice

outside the chain-of-command despite the apparent existence of out-

of-the-ordinary pressure to launch on time. Similarly, in their

decision to ignore the objections of the technical experts and to fail to

explain to the technical experts the nature of the out-of-the-ordinary

pressure to launch on time, the lower-level experts assumed the

chain-of-command would not be circumvented. The role of this

emphasis upon the chain-of-command in obscuring accountability

emerged during the investigation. Technical experts at the bottom of

the chain-of-command were not accountable for the the decision to

launch while higher-level managers at the top of the chain-of-

command were not accountable for recognition of the technical risks

associated with launching in the environmental conditions at the

time. Lower-level managers were able to avoid accountability for

both the final decision to launch (made by higher levels of

management) and for recognition of the technical risks associated

with launching (resting in the failure of technical experts to provide

justification against launching in technical specifications or formal

regulations).

Each of these factors--the management chain-of-command, the role

of technical specifications and formal regulations, and the availability

of information--served to both hinder the ability of decision-makers

to act and to obscure accountability for their decision-making. As

such, they served to limit the responsibility of individuals within the

decision-making process and to render that process itself

irresponsible. These obstacles to responsibility within NASA point to

the more important ethical problem that existed beyond the scope of

the specific instance of the Challenger disaster. Namely, the poor

nature of the decision-making process within NASA and its negative

role in fostering responsibility, both on the part of individuals and on

the part of the organization as a whole.