Essay, Research Paper: Human Rights Abuse: Authority And Judicial Killings In Nigeria

In 2006 report on human rights practices around the world reflects that Nigeria's human rights record was "poor." According to the report, Nigerian government officials and police were responsible for "serious abuses," including politically motivated killings; the use of lethal force against suspected criminals and hostage-seizing militants; beatings and even torture of suspects, detainees, and convicts; and extortion of civilians. Other abuses included violence, discrimination, and female genital cutting, child labor and prostitution, and human trafficking.



AUTHORITY AND JUDICIAL KILLINGS IN NIGERIA

INTRODUCTION
In May of 1999 Nigeria underwent a transition to civilian rule after sixteen years of violent, oppressive and corrupt military rule. As General Olusegun Obasanjo was sworn in as the country’s new president, some hopeful analysts talked of the “emergence of a democratic dawn” (Obayiuwana 2001, p.24). To be sure, some improvements were noted after the 1999 transition. Human Rights Watch (2003e, p.2) conceded that “significant improvements in freedom of expression and civil liberties were among the immediate gains of Nigeria’s transition to civilian rule in 1999.” After the transition, the United Nation’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights saw fit to discontinue the special country mandate for Nigeria which had been in effect from 1997 to 1999 (UN Commission on Human Rights 2004).
Five years and one general election later, it seems that the emergent democracy spotted in 1999 was only a false dawn. Writing in Africa News Service on the fourth anniversary of Nigeria’s “transition to democracy”, Chima Ubana (2003, p.1008153u2650) remarked bitterly that,
The last four years have confirmed that the absence of military rule is not necessarily synonymous with democracy. There can be such a thing as undemocratic or dictatorial civil rule, as the last four years have shown, and we have now seen that a civilian government can violate human rights with as much impunity as military dictatorship and that the socio-economic conditions of the people can be as miserable. We have witnessed four years in which over ten thousand Nigerians were executed in over fifty documented incidents of judicial killings...

Through a series of reports based on in-depth investigations and first-hand accounts, the international organization Human Rights Watch has systematically documented a broad range of egregious human rights violations – including politically motivated killings by Nigerian police, military, and others – occurring in Nigeria over the past few years. According to Human Rights Watch and other authorities, the current civilian administration has done virtually nothing to halt these atrocities and these judicial killings have often occurred with tacit support of and/or sometimes even at the instigation of the government.

This paper provides an overview and analysis of Authority, Political and judicial killings as a major human rights abuse in Nigeria. The analysis focuses on the more recent continued problem of judicial killing as it has occurred under the civilian administration since May of 1999. The investigation provides an overview of the abuse and its context, including a discussion of where, how and why the abuse is occurring. Additional sections identify and discuss the application of existing international human rights law to the problem of judicial killing in Nigeria; describe and evaluate relevant United Nations procedural action against this type of human rights abuse; and describe and evaluate complementary and alternative strategies and procedures to address this serious abuse of human rights in Nigeria.

THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORIY AND JUDICIAL KILLINGS IN NIGERIA

Definition. “Judicial killing” refers to killing or execution completed outside of the scope and protection of any judicial procedure. It is not a synonym for the common crime of murder, nor is it typically used to refer to political assassination. The typical “perpetrators” of judicial killing are agents of the legitimate government or authority, such as police, military, or security forces. In some cases, judicial killing may be carried out by private-sector forces (e.g., vigilante group) who act with the overt or tacit support of the authorities. The typical “victims” of judicial killings are ordinary citizens, although they may be targeted for judicial killings because of their specific activities (e.g., political activities) or affiliations.


Scope of the Problem

Ubani (2003) argues that “judicial killings are the order of the day” in Nigeria, “especially while the police try to extort money from motorists at the numerous checkpoints.” Ubani (2003) cites as the most notorious cases of extrajudicial killings the massacre of villagers in Odi in Bayelsa State in 1999 and Zaki Biam and other Tiv villages in Benue State in 2002. The international organization Human Rights Watch has published a number of reports over the past few years documenting extensive human rights abuses in Nigeria, including authority killing. A report published in April of 2002 focused on the judicial killings in Benue State in central-eastern Nigeria. Human Rights Watch (2002a, p.2) reported that on October 22-24, 2001, several hundred Nigerian army soldiers killed more than two hundred unarmed civilians in seven towns and villages in Benue State. In the small town of Gbeji alone, more than 150 people were killed. The killings were, according to Human Rights Watch (2002a, p.2) “a well-planned military operation.” The soldiers were apparently retaliating for the killing of nineteen soldiers in the same area a couple of week earlier. The alleged perpetrators of that killing were members of the Tiv ethnic group, as were the victims of the October 2001 judicial killings. The Obasanjo government denounced the killing of the 19 soldiers and urged that “no effort be spared to track down the perpetrators” (Human Rights Watch 2002a, p.2). However, in the aftermath of the extrajudicial killings, “President Obasanjo appeared to defend these actions and seek to legitimise them...he even indicated that this was the kind of response which could be expected from soldiers, and that they may have been acting in self-defense.”

While the judicial killings in Benue State were carried out by the military, in a number of southeastern states, judicial killings have been carried out by a vigilante groups such as the Bakassi Boys. Human Rights Watch (2002b, p.2) reports that the Bakassi Boys were initially created a few years ago by traders to fight crime in large market towns in Abia and Anambra States, but since that time, they have expanded their operations across a number of the south-eastern states and gained the active support of state governments (even gaining legal support in Anambra state). According to Human Rights Watch (2002b), the state and local governments see the Bakassi Boys and other vigilante groups as a “solution” to the local crime problem and to the perceived failure of the federal police to control the problem. Human Rights Watch (2002b, p.24) describes the scope of the Bakassi Boys’ involvement in judicial killings:
Setting themselves up as self-appointed authority and judges, juries and executioners, the Bakassi Boys have killed scores of people after putting them through their own form of ‘trial,’ resulting in apparently arbitrary decisions as to the individual’s guilt or innocence, often on the basis of fabricated evidence, evidence extracted under torture, or no evidence at al...Public summary and arbitrary executions have also been carried out with impunity by the Bakassi Boys in Imo State...started executing people as soon as they began their operations in Imo...They showed everyone that ‘the real Bakassi Boys’ had arrived by slaughtered two persons believed to be criminals on the major streets, apparently to send a warning signal to all criminals...


Human Rights Watch (2002b, p.38) reports that thus far, “the federal government has done little to put a stop to the abuses of the Bakassi Boys. It has opted not to interfere in the affairs of state governors.”
The Nigerian federal government’s lack of response to the Bakassi Boys contrasts markedly with its campaign against another group also associated with vigilante activity (in the southwest) – the O’odua People’s Congress (OPC). The OPC is a Yoruba self-determination group with two main spheres of activity – ethnic militancy and vigilantism. Human Rights Watch (2002c, p.1) reports that although the OPC is itself responsible for extensive human rights abuses, its members have also been the victims of human rights abuses, including judicial killings carried out by the police. In 1999, the government announced a formal ban on the OPC and gave police orders to “shoot on sight” any members of the OPC they encountered. Human Rights Watch (2002c, p.43) detailed the scope of judicial killings of OPC members by the Nigerian police:
The police have shot dead scores of real or suspected OPC members, in the course of their operations to crack down on the organization. Some were killed when police stormed OPC meetings, others in the context of shoot-outs between the OPC and police. In many cases, it appeared that the police shot at them indiscriminately and made little or no attempt to arrest them without resorting to lethal force. Many of those killed may not even have been armed at the time...

Judicial killings have frequently occurred in conjunction with local, state and federal elections (Human Rights Watch 2003b; Tertsakian 2003; Human Rights Watch 2003d, 2003e). In an April 2003 report, Human Rights Watch (2003b) documented a wide range of politically-motivated violence (including authority and judicial killings) associated with the local elections in 2002. In this report, Human Rights Watch (2002b) documented how police often refused to make arrest or released violent perpetrators on orders from politicians. In other cases, police eagerly carried out judicial killings, either at the behest of politicians or on their own initiative. HRW’s predictions about the 2003 April-May general elections came true. Reports indicate that there were more than one hundred judicial killings during these elections which were heralded by Foreign Secretary Jack Straw as “a landmark in the advancement of Nigeria’s democracy” (Tertsakian 2003, p.21).
According to a July 2003 Human Rights Watch (2003c) report, political disputes and rivalries were behind much of the violence (including judicial killings) associated with the November 2002 “Miss World Riots”. The spark for these riots, in which Muslim and Christian groups fought each other for three days in the northern city of Kaduna (where the Miss World contest was underway), was sparked by a newspaper article perceived as blasphemous by some Muslims. Muslims attacked Christians, Christians retaliated against Muslims and a cycle of violence erupted. Human Rights Watch (2003c) argues that local political leaders exploited religious sentiment to inflame the situation. The police, who were called in to stop the violence, actually contributed to it by judicially killing dozens of people during the riots. Human Rights Watch (2003c, p.13) detailed how the police and the military turned against the people they were supposed to protect:
In some cases, the victims were boys or young men who were shot because they were caught breaking the curfew; in other cases, people were killed or injured when the police or military fired to deter rioting...In a number of instances, the police or military, taking advantage of the general chaos, targeted particular individuals with the specific intention of killing them.

Judicial killings have also been motivated by economic reasons. Most notably, there have been a number of judicial killings surrounding fuel disputes and the oil business in Nigeria (Human Rights Watch 2003d, 2003e). Human Rights Watch (2003d, p.2) reported that during 2003, dozens of people in Nigeria’s Delta State (which produces 40% of Nigeria’s oil) were judicially killed by security forces. In July of 2003, extrajudicial killings occurred in the context of protests against the government’s sudden 50% increase in the price of fuel. There was general public outrage at the government’s decision. Widespread protests and labor strikes occurred in response to the price hike. The government responded by calling in the police and the military police to restore order. Human Rights Watch (2003e, p.8) reported the results:
Large numbers of police (both regular police and paramilitary mobile police) were deployed across the country. IN a manner reminiscent of the military era in Nigeria, they violent broke up demonstrations and rallies, dispersing protestors with tear-gas and live shots, even when there was no sign of violence. They shot dead several protestors and passers by...At least twelve people, and possibly more than twenty, were killed...

There is no indication that judicial killings are becoming any less frequent in 2004 than they were in 2003. In early May of 2004, Human Rights Watch (2004b) called on the Nigerian government to conduct an independent investigation into the massacre of several hundred people in Yelwa. HRW noted that while the massacre was on the surface an ethnic and political conflict, the police and security forces took no action to stop the violence and may indeed even have contributed to the killing. Human Rights Watch (2004c) reported that on May 13, 2004, Nigerian police fired into a crowd in the northern city of Kano, killing around 40 people and wounding scores of others. According to credible witnesses, the police, who had been dispatched to quell rioting and violence between Christians and Muslims, were instructed to “shoot on sight” (Human Rights Watch 2004c). Looking to the future, Human Rights Watch (2004a) warns that the experience of the 2003 general elections – wherein more than 100 people were killed – bodes ill for the next general elections, scheduled to take place in 2007.
Reasons behind the Problem
There are a number of reasons why judicial killings are occurring in Nigeria. While ethnic conflict and widespread civil unrest are certainly contributing factors which encourage judicial executions, the main motivations behind judicial killings seems to be political and economic. Although personal motivations of revenge and a culture/tradition which has long emphasized violence as the only means to control violence often provide the initial impetus for judicial executions, the reality remains that they are most often carried out in a political context and/or as part of a political/economic conflict.
Moreover, the primary reasons why these human rights abuses continue to occur unabated in Nigeria stems from two main factors: 1) the freedom and impunity of those who carry out the killings (primarily the police and the military, but also certain sanctioned groups); and 2) the complicity of local, state, and especially, federal authorities. Human Rights Watch (2002b, p.31) notes that,
Judicial executions are a long-standing human rights problem in Nigeria and have often occurred in the context of security force interventions to contain inter-communal conflict, police efforts to curb armed robbery, and in the course of illegal police activity such as traffic checkpoints set up to extort money from motorists. Police initiatives introduced in 2002 authorized police officers to open fire in ‘very difficult’ circumstances without the approval of their superiors, including whenever a police station is ‘under attack’ by rioters. Dubbed “Operation Fire for Fire” these initiatives highlight the culture of conflict that exists between police and the population they are meant to protect.
As Human Rights Watch has repeatedly documented, the Nigerian government has been loathe to take any real action against the problem of judicial killing, whether it is carried out by police, military, or vigilante groups.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW & UN PROCEDURES

Customary and accepted international human rights law clearly prohibits authority and judicial killing of the sort which has occurred regularly in Nigeria. Adopted by the UN in 1948 (it is part of the UN Charter), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is one of the earliest and best known components of customary international law which prohibits judicial killing. Article 3 of that Declaration asserts that “everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person” while Article 8 affirms that “Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law” and Article 10 asserts that “Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair, and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his right and obligations and of any criminal charge against him” (cited from Human Rights Web 1997).
Other well known international treaties and covenants which directly or indirectly prohibit judicial killing include the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Convention Against Genocide, and the Convention Against Torture (Human Rights Web 1997).
Nigeria is a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (Human Rights Watch 2002a, p.3). Article 6.1 of the ICCPR clearly prohibits judicial killing: “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life” (Human Rights Web 1997). The ICCPR also addresses the situation in countries with the death penalty (such as Nigeria). Article 6.2 states that in
...countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court (Human Rights Web 1997).

Nigeria is also a party to the UN’s Torture Convention which has been interpreted to prohibit judicial killing (Human Rights Watch 2003e, p.4). Nigeria’s condoning of judicial killing is also a breach of its own constitutional provisions (Sections 33 and 34 guarantee the right to life and right to human dignity) and its obligations under regional conventions such as the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (Human Rights Watch 2003e, p.4; Udombana 2003).
As Rodley (2003, p.882) explains,”there are two broad clusters of United Nations human rights machinery: those set up under international human rights treaties (treaty bodies)and those established by the UN Commission on Human Rights (special procedures). Under the applicable treaties (i.e., Torture Convention, Genocide Convention, ICCPR, Universal Declaration of Human Rights), Party States are obligated to comply with the terms of the convention or treaty and also agree to be subject to “monitoring” by treaty bodies (generally elected by one multilateral cluster and reporting to another). The Treaty Bodies provide interpretation of the treaties and convention and monitor compliance with the treaties among the States parties (Rodley 2003). The UN Human Rights Committee, for example, monitors compliance with the ICCPR. The UN Human Rights Committee has previously made specific recommendations related to the right to life and the prohibition against extrajudicial killing. In 1982 the Committee noted,
The protection against arbitrary deprivation of life...is of paramount importance. The Committee considers that States parties should take measures not only to prevent and punish deprivation of life by criminal acts, but also to prevent arbitrary killing by their own security forces. The deprivation of life by the authorities of the State is a matter of the utmost gravity... (cited in Human Rights Watch 2003c, p.14).

In addition to the treaty bodies, the UN has a range of “special procedures” to monitor and enforce human rights via the UN Commission on Human Rights. Comprised of 53 states, the Commission on Human Rights meets each year in regular sessions for six weeks as well as meeting in special sessions at the behest of a majority of States members (UNHCHR 2004). The Special Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights take place in two main categories: 1) country mechanisms of mandates (focusing on human rights situations in specific countries or territories) and thematic mechanisms or mandates (focusing on major phenomena of human rights violations worldwide) (UNHCHR 2004). The Commission had a country mandate in place for Nigeria from 1997 to 1999, but discontinued it following the transition to a civilian government. The Commission does currently have in place a special thematic mechanism on judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions. This Working Group has a mandate to investigate all situations of judicial killings (with special attention to killings of women and children and peace demonstrators) and to monitor and make recommendations for compliance. In addition to these Special Procedures and regular mechanisms of Treaty bodies, various UN Committees and Working Groups have promulgated Codes of Conduct and other polices to help guide countries. For example, the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials prohibits extrajudicial killing and lays out proper guidelines for law enforcement officers (Human Rights Watch 2003c, p.14).



EVALUATION OF COMPLEMENTARY & ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES & PROCEDURES

Based on the evidence that authority and judicial killings are continuing in Nigeria under the current civilian government, it is fair to say that existing UN procedures have been inadequate to curtail these abuses. At the same time, it should be noted that the UN is not failing in isolation. There are a wide variety of complementary procedures which should be addressing the problem. As Udombana (2003, p.1) notes, “the local remedies rule is a general rule of international procedural law.” The local remedies rule, which is often applied in international treaty law, basically states that local authorities and remedies should first be used (to exhaustion) to solve problems or breaches in international law. This is consistent with the international norm of non-interference in the affairs of a sovereign state. Udombana (2003, p.4) notes that this “local remedies” bias persists through international human rights treaties and conventions as well as in regional human rights conventions, including the African Charter (to which Nigeria is a party).
The local remedies mandate of the African Charter and various other regional and international human rights agreements also calls upon other States parties to take action and place pressure on the violating Party. Udombana (2003) notes that the Human Rights Committee of the African Charter has on several occasions attempted to sanction Nigeria for violations of human rights, including widespread judicial killings. These efforts have been largely ineffective. Another regional group which might in theory pressure the Nigerian government to take action against judicial killing is the Commonwealth, a 52-member institution comprised of countries formerly ruled by Britain. Nigeria is a member of the Commonwealth. In 1991 the Commonwealth members made their Harare Declaration which essentially pledged to promote and protect human rights within its member states (Mungoven 2003; Economist 1997). A number of analysts argue that the Commonwealth members (particularly the UK as its leader) have failed to live up to their commitments under the Harare Declaration by ignoring the human rights abuses in Nigeria. Not only the members of the Commonwealth, but also the most powerful democracies in the world (e.g., the U.S., Germany, Japan, France, etc.) have utterly failed to put pressure on Nigeria to put an end to the authority and judicial killings.

Abdul-Raheem Hassan Taiwo Teddy
GLOBAL UNIFICATION
INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH AND HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENT CENTRE

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